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Access to reliable information is crucial to the ability of a democratic society to coordinate 
effective collective action, especially when responding to crises such as global pandemics, and 
complex challenges such as climate change. We define an epistemically secure society as one 
that reliably averts threats to the processes by which reliable information is produced, 
distributed, acquired and assessed within the society. 
 
Citizens of contemporary, technologically rich societies have greater access to information than 
at any point in history. However, while new technologies make information more widely 
accessible, information abundance and other changes brought about by new technologies 
highlight a different set of threats and vulnerabilities in our systems of information production 
and exchange. We identify the following themes: 
 
1. Adversaries and blunderers can more readily interfere with decision-making processes, 
through [dis/mis]information or other harmful actions than in the past. 
2. Information abundance means the attention of information recipients is spread thin, 
making it harder to ensure essential information reaches all important parties. This 
leads to an attention economy in which tradeoffs are made between the truth-
orientation of information and attention-grabbing strategies. 
3. Insular communities that reject information that challenges their accepted views quickly 
emerge and persist. Strong in-group identity leads to greater polarisation between 
groups.  
4. Information mediating and producing technologies make it more difficult to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of individual information sources.  
 
Through a series of workshops we developed and analysed a set of hypothetical yet plausible 
crisis scenarios to explore how external threats and internal vulnerabilities to epistemic security 
can be mitigated in order to facilitate timely decision-making and collective action in 
democratic societies. Overall we observed that preserving a democratic society’s epistemic 
security is a complex effort that sits at the interface of many knowledge domains, theoretical 
perspectives, value systems, and institutional responsibilities. 
 
Consequently, challenges to epistemic security cannot be addressed as a laundry list of threats 
with narrowly targeted fixes. To do so may cause more harm than good because societies can 
suffer from multiple interconnected threats and vulnerabilities, and proposed solutions to each 
can have unintended first-, second-, and higher-order consequences. Epistemic threats are 
therefore best considered via a holistic and interdisciplinary approach that takes into account 
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the broader socio-technological contexts in which the threats have emerged. We developed the 
following recommendations to highlight areas where additional research and resources will 
likely have a significant impact on epistemic security in democratic societies:  
 
1. Develop technological and institutional methods to increase the cost for adversaries 
and blunderers in spreading unsupported, fabricated, or false information.  
2. Develop methods of helping information consumers more easily identify trustworthy 
information sources.  
3. Explore technological and institutional methods to "signal boost" reliable decision-
relevant information in an asymmetric manner. Recognize that evaluations of what 
constitutes reliable and decision-relevant information will most often benefit from the 
input of diverse communities and interest groups.  
4. Develop technological and institutional methods to monitor changes in epistemic 
systems and to rapidly detect adversarial epistemic action during times of tension or 
crises.  
5. Build capacity for and engage in holistic systems-mapping procedures (constructing an 
integrated view of social epistemic systems) and red-teaming strategies (deliberately 
exploring a scenario from an adversary's perspective) to help identify and analyse 
epistemic threats.   
6. Establish working relationships with a diverse array of experts who are experienced in 
identifying and analysing epistemic threats and who could serve as epistemic security 
advisors before and during crises.  
7. Invest in building and curating diverse and multidisciplinary epistemic security research 
groups and expert networks. 
 
We provide a more extensive discussion of recommendation 5 in the final section of the report. 
We describe how holistic systems-mapping and red-teaming strategies might be implemented 
to better understand complex social epistemic systems and to help identify and analyze 
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The capacity of a democratic society for timely decision-making and for organizing collective 
action is crucial to navigating crises and complex challenges. Examples of such crises and 
challenges include voting out officials who no longer serve the public interest, responding to 
impending natural disasters, and eliminating or halting the spread of a disease through 
vaccination.  
 
Given the dispersed nature of democratic processes, the capacities for timely decision-making 
and collective action are easily undermined by disrupting the processes by which information is 
gathered, distributed, and assessed by decision-making bodies and by the public. If there is no 
shared belief among the actors in a community about the nature of a crisis or the efficacy of a 
proposed response, collective action is less likely to ensue. 
 
We call detrimental interferences to systems of information production and dissemination 
epistemic threats. Epistemic threats include blatant censorship efforts or misinformation 
campaigns, the erosion of trust in expertise, the formation of insular communities, the 
suppression of diverse viewpoints and marginalized voices, and so on. An epistemically secure 
society is one that is robust to such threats. In this report we pay special attention to 
technologically-enabled epistemic threats to systems of information production and 
dissemination and to technologically-exacerbated vulnerabilities within those systems. 
 
While new technologies aid in the production and dissemination of decision-guiding 
information, they can also enable and exacerbate threats to production and dissemination of 
reliable information. Consider the following hypothetical scenario drawn from our workshop 
proceedings (Workshop scenario 5: Xenophobic Ethnic Cleansing) in which information 
technologies are used to exacerbate a crisis and undermine effective response. 
 
● A radical xenophobic group decides to turn the population of their country against a 
minority community of recently-arrived refugees. 
● They produce a low-grade chemical weapon, and release it near a school in a poverty-
stricken suburb of a major city, taking several videos of the operation. 
● They edit the videos with face-swapping apps to make it appear as if a recognised figure 
from the refugee community was the perpetrator. 
● They release the videos as "breaking news" on right-leaning social media groups and 
through various messaging apps. Social media posts are targeted to specific individuals 
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and groups and modified to most effectively agitate the audience given personality traits 
and predispositions inferred from social media profiles. 
● The extremist group also releases messages saying "the government is going to cover 
this up and blame it on some scapegoat to avoid scrutiny of their reckless immigration 
policy". 
● When officials reliably do respond to the attack and rumours, and question the validity of 
the videos, the radicals spread a call to "all patriotic citizens" to "carry out justice and 
drive out the terrorists". They provide specific times and places to gather and lists of 
targets (refugee shelters, businesses owned by refugees, government buildings housing 
refugee affairs offices, etc.) 
● Different officials make rushed or contradicting statements, some calling for calm and 
patience while investigations are ongoing, while others promise quick action and swift 
resolution.  
● Individuals within law enforcement who are sympathetic to the xenophobic cause break 
rank and publicly criticise the government for a slow and hesitant response, and 
(anonymously) offer information and assistance in circumventing law enforcement. 
● Shocked, afraid and angry mobs rally to the call and carry out vandalism and, on some 
occasions, assault. 
 
Crisis scenarios such as the one above highlight how interference with the dissemination of 
reliable information can compromise decision-making and collective action efforts. The same 
point is illustrated by the present COVID-19 pandemic and the accompanying ‘infodemic’ in 
which inaccurate information and the silencing of important information sources have 
degraded trust in health authorities and slowed public response to the crisis (Hubert et. al. 
2020, WHO 2020, Reviving the US CDC, 2020). Misinformation about ineffective cures, the 
origins and malicious spread of COVID-19, unverified treatment discoveries, and the efficacy of 
face coverings have increased the difficulty of coordinating unified public response during the 
crisis (Jourova, 2020).  
 
This report is long in the making, during which time the COVID-19 crisis has unfurled. 
Throughout the crisis we have found it useful to think about the pandemic through the lens of 
epistemic security we develop here. While it is unlikely the contents of this report approach a 
solution to managing infodemics such as that which has slowed the response to COVID-19, we 
hope that the recommendations we present for the promotion of epistemically secure 
democracies will help us be more resilient to similar events in the future.  
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1.1 The epistemic security workshops 
 
In 2018, when this project started, much research had already been conducted into specific 
technologically-enabled threats and vulnerabilities (see section 2.2). However, less attention 
has been paid to how these threats ultimately affect a democratic society’s capacity for 
collective decision-making and action, and more practically, how decision-making bodies can 
take steps to mitigate these threats and vulnerabilities. This gap in practical research led the 
authors to conduct a series of workshops in 2018 and 2019 exploring how technological 
challenges (epistemic threats) to the production and distribution of reliable information affect a 
democractic society’s capacities for collective decision-making and action and how these 
threats can be practically addressed.2 The workshops were held in collaboration between the 
Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge, the Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory of the UK Ministry of Defence, and the Alan Turing Institute. 
 
The hypothetical scenario outlined above was one of six explored in the workshops to guide our 
investigation. Other workshop scenarios are presented as ‘blue box’ examples throughout the 
report. 
 
We found hypothetical crisis scenarios3 to be useful tools for appraising threats and 
vulnerabilities to social epistemic systems. Factors that influence a society’s epistemic security 
are not always obvious when life is relatively tranquil but are highlighted under the stress of a 
crisis. By exploring hypothetical crisis scenarios we aim to identify real threats and 
vulnerabilities and address them ahead of time in order to prevent a crisis or to make our 
response more effective. 
 
The challenges and strategies discussed at the workshops demonstrated the need to take a 
holistic systems approach to epistemic security, such as systems-mapping procedures 
(constructing an integrated view of social epistemic systems) and red-teaming strategies 
(deliberately exploring a scenario from an adversary's perspective). Decision-making bodies can 
be thought of as distributed socio-technical information systems which operate within a 
broader information environment. The workshops highlighted that it is unlikely to be effective to 
treat technologies that exacerbate or pose new threats to epistemic security as a laundry list of 
independent threats each with a prescribed fix. Societies can suffer from multiple 
interconnected threats and vulnerabilities, and proposed solutions to each may have 
unintended first-, second-, and higher-order consequences.  
 
2 A summary of direct outputs from the workshop series is presented in Appendix 2. 
3 See Appendix 1 for a full list of hypothetical scenarios developed and discussed in the workshop series. 
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1.2 Report Overview 
In section 2 we provide background information about epistemology and epistemic security, 
present a brief overview of related works, and discuss the scope and restrictions of this report. 
In particular, we attend to the inherently intertwined nature of value systems and information 
systems in a democracy and acknowledge the difficulties this presents for conducting a 
focussed discussion on vulnerabilities in epistemic infrastructure. 
 
In section 3 we present concepts and categories to help analyse epistemic security as the 
challenge of building and maintaining a robust social epistemic infrastructure which, in turn, 
enables well-informed decision-making and timely collective action in a society. We explore 
four broad themes that can lead to epistemic vulnerabilities, linking them to areas where 
emerging technologies pose heightened risk or present promising opportunities. A more 
detailed categorisation of specific threats from emerging technologies is presented in 
Appendix 3, and Appendix 4 proposes a preliminary model for a quantitative analysis of threats 
to epistemic security. 
 
In section 4 we present preliminary recommendations for tackling the challenges of epistemic 
security, highlighting the importance of avoiding narrowly-targeted quick-fixes and the need to 
build a diverse and robust community of experts to tackle these challenges in a context-specific 
manner. 
 
Building on these recommendations, in section 5 we emphasize holistic "systems-mapping" 
and "red-teaming" strategies as promising methodologies for identifying, assessing and 
mitigating challenges of epistemic security. We describe how these strategies were used 
throughout our workshops to appraise hypothetical crisis scenarios like that illustrated in the 
introduction. Further information about the workshops and scenarios developed is presented in 
Appendices 1 and 2.  
 
We conclude with final remarks in section 6. 
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2.  Background 
2.1 Why "Epistemic" Security? 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature and processes of 
knowledge.4 Epistemic processes are the processes by which information is produced, 
distributed, acquired and assessed by individuals and within social communities (see Figure 1).   
 
 
Figure 1: Epistemic processes 
 
At a social level, epistemic processes can become highly complex. We use the term social 
epistemic infrastructure to refer to the vast collection of systems, artefacts, and actors that 
influence a society’s epistemic processes.5 Academic departments and think tanks, artists, 
 
4 Epistemologists traditionally understand knowledge as justified true beliefs, and much ink has been 
spilled debating the precise conditions required for a person to ‘be justified’ in their beliefs. However, in 
this report we focus less on an individual's knowledge or beliefs, and focus instead on the complex 
network of epistemic processes enroute to knowledge, that impact a society’s ability to make decisions 
and to organise timely collective action, especially in response to crises and complex challenges. Critical 
decisions in times of crisis often must be made in the relative absence of knowledge and instead must be 
based on the best available information. Ideally, decision-makers will base their decisions on true 
information from reliable sources, but, as we outline in this report, various factors can interfere with the 
production and dissemination of reliable information. Therefore, for the purpose of this report we will set 
aside further reference to knowledge and instead speak in terms of decision-guiding information. As true 
information is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for knowledge, interferences in the spread and 
uptake of true information are also threats to knowledge, and therefore form a good starting point to 
explore epistemic security. 
5 Infrastructure has also been used in epistemology of journalism to describe technologically-enabled 
systems that facilitate or constrain news flows (Carlson 2020). In history of science, epistemic 
infrastructure also refers to the collections of knowledge curated in museums, libraries, archives, zoos 
etc. Epistemic infrastructures organize knowledge so that it can be easily accessed and used to inform 
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experts, government departments and organisations (including militaries and intelligence 
agencies), interest groups, traditional and social media platforms, public communities, activists, 
corporations, financial markets, and various information and communication technologies all 
play overlapping roles (sometimes complimentary, sometimes antagonistic) influencing how 
information is produced, modified, evaluated and distributed within the society.  
 
In general, the variety of social epistemic infrastructures has been of great benefit to human 
communities. Research in collective intelligence and group cognition shows that large scale 
collaboration between diverse groups of people is essential to scientific discovery and 
technological advancement (Anderson & Wagenknecht 2013; Malone 2018; Wray 2002). When 
factions of a community are in disagreement, a social environment of critique plays a key role in 
maintaining accountability and high epistemic standards for the production and dissemination 
of reliable information (Longino 2002; Winsberg, Huebner & Kukla 2014).  
 
However, while large, diverse, interconnected societies are epistemically advantageous, 
intricate social epistemic infrastructures are also more vulnerable to epistemic threats or risks - 
risks of error arising anywhere in a society's processes of information acquisition, distribution 
and evaluation (Biddle & Kukla 2017, p.218). The more complicated a social epistemic 
infrastructure is, the more opportunities there are for accidental or intentional disruption to a 
society's epistemic processes, preventing the society from reliably yielding and dealing in true 
information. 
 
As illustrated in the ‘Xenophobic Ethnic Cleansing’ scenario and the COVID-19 pandemic, 
threats to a society's production and distribution of true information can be severely 
detrimental to its capacity for timely and well-informed decision-making and collective action. 
Therefore it is important for a society to take steps to strengthen itself against epistemic threats 
- influencing factors that interfere with the well-functioning of a society’s epistemic processes - 
and minimize its epistemic vulnerabilities - weak points in a social epistemic infrastructure that 
are most likely to succumb to epistemic threats. An epistemically secure society is one that 
reliably averts epistemic threats and minimizes vulnerabilities in its social epistemic 
infrastructures. 
 
Accordingly, we also use the term epistemic security as a holistic umbrella for investigations 
into the processes by which societies produce, distribute, evaluate and assimilate information, 
and into threats that restrict access to information, or undermine our ability to evaluate 
information veracity or information source reliability. We are particularly concerned with how 
 
further action or investigation. (Hedstrom 2005). Our use of epistemic infrastructure is broader and 
encapsulates both of these uses. 
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threats to epistemic security undermine a society's ability to make well-informed and timely 
decisions and to coordinate action in response to crises.  
2.2 Related Work 
Numerous recent scholars point to increasing evidence that the systems of information 
production, evaluation, and distribution that inform collective action in contemporary liberal 
democracies are compromised, in large part due to recent social changes and technological 
innovations. In The Misinformation Age (2019), O'Connor and Weatherall explore numerous 
social factors that contribute to misinformation. Both Computational Propaganda: Political 
Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media (2018) by Woolley and Howard 
and Lie Machines (2020) by Howard detail how technological advances are used by political 
and private actors from around the globe, to confuse and control collective attention with 
detrimental effects to collective decision-making and trust in democracy. In The existential 
threat from cyber-enabled information warfare, Lin (2019) describes how technologically-
enabled [dis/mis]information poses an existential threat to key pillars of democracy, and in 
Common-knowledge attacks on democracy, Schneier and Farell (2018) explain that 
democracies are disproportionately more vulnerable to [dis/mis]information attacks than 
autocracies. Similar themes are explored in Runciman's (2018) How Democracy Ends and 
Pomerantsev’s (2019) This is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality from a 
political science and cultural analysis perspective, as well as in Network Propaganda: 
Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics, by Benkler, Faris and 
Roberts (2018). Bucher studies the effect of algorithms and informational infrastructures on 
social life in If...Then: Algorithmic Power and Politics (2018), while Vaidhyanathan in Anti-social 
media - How Facebook Disconnects Us and Undermines Democracy, (2018) focusses on one 
platform in particular. Hwang (2019) explores similar themes in Maneuver and Manipulation 
from a military strategy perspective.  
 
Several government and institutional reports also investigate the influence of technology on 
social epistemic systems. Examples include a RAND Corporation research report titled The 
Emerging Risk of Virtual Societal Warfare - Social Manipulation in a Changing Information 
Environment (Mazarr et al. 2019), a NATO STRATCOM report that reviews Government 
Responses to Malicious Use of Social Media (Bradshaw, Neudert & Howard 2018), and the 
European Commission’s (2018) report on fake news and online disinformation titled a multi-
dimensional approach to disinformation. 
 
A special role in enhancing the capabilities of propagandists and misinformers has been 
ascribed to artificial intelligence, for example in Chessen's (2017) The MADCOM Future, 
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Kertysova’s (2018) Artificial Intelligence and Disinformation, and in the section on political 
security of Brundage & Avin et al.'s (2018) The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence.  
 
Particular attention has been paid to synthetic media, including "deep fakes", as discussed by 
Chesney and Citron (2018) and in reports from Deeptrace Labs (Ajder et. al. 2019), the 
International Risk Governance Center (Collins 2019), and the Center for Security and Emerging 
Technology (Hwang 2020). The growing attention to this cluster of issues has led to a UK 
government inquiry into disinformation and fake news (House of Commons Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport Committee, 2019) and proposed legislation on online harms, and a US 
congressional hearing (U.S. House of Representatives, 2019) on deep fakes and several 
proposed bills on the issue.  
 
There is ongoing work on this cluster of issues at various universities including at the University 
of Oxford by the "Computational Propaganda" project6, at the RAND Corporation under the 
heading "Truth Decay"7, by the DARPA funded "Media Forensics" project8, and by independent 
research institutions such as Data & Society9, the Thoughtful Technology Project10, and the 
Centre for Humane Technology11. MisinfoCon12 also provides a publication venue and 
conference for related issues, and the Credibility Coalition13 coordinates various organisations 
in this space.  
 
The above review only scratches the surface of a mushrooming response to what we call 
challenges of epistemic security. Activity in this space, both within and outside academia, has 
expanded significantly during the period in which this report has been compiled. We hope our 
workshop findings - arrived at via a more holistic perspective and through the application of 
different methodologies - make a useful contribution to the discussion by situating a collection 
of related concerns into a broader epistemic framework and by proposing a method for working 
through scenarios to work towards robust policy recommendations. 
2.3 Focus and limits of this report 
Social epistemic infrastructures are highly complex, and therefore the ways in which they can 











covered in a single workshop series or report. To make the scope more tractable, we have 
restricted our focus in two key ways. 
 
First, we focus primarily on epistemic security in affluent, technology-rich liberal democracies 
in which crisis aversion requires collective decision-making and action, and on crises and 
challenges with a potential to cause society-wide harms. This focus implies certain 
assumptions and limitations. See section 2.3.1 for an extended discussion. 
 
Second, we restrict ourselves to a descriptive analysis to how information is produced, 
distributed, and consumed by distributed decision-makers. We do not focus on the various 
ways in which decision-maker values can influence preferences and incentives and shape 
social epistemic infrastructures. Though individual and group values are inseparably 
intertwined with, and have a significant influence on, collective decision making (especially 
when the values held by distributed decision-makers clash) we find it useful to artificially 
bracket them out of our conversation for the time being. We direct readers concerned with our 
delineation between epistemic systems and value systems to section 2.3.2 where we expand on 
the limitations of our approach and explain further our decision to proceed in this way.   
 
2.3.1 Affluent, technology-rich liberal democracies 
Our focus on affluent, technology-rich liberal democracies, such as the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom, many members of the European Union, and many others, is 
motivated in part by the remarkable impact of digital technologies on information processes in 
those states (both positive and negative), by the essential role of distributed decision-making in 
these systems of governance, and by the locality of the organisations contributing to this report, 
all based in the UK. 
 
For our investigation of epistemic security, this focus implies certain assumptions: 
● In a democratic society power resides ideally (or at least partially and comparatively) 
with the citizens. Decision-making takes a distributed form. The power of citizens is 
expressed via direct voting, representation or pressure placed on representatives via the 
withdrawal of public approval of their policies. Citizens engage in a deliberation process 
and feed their personal decision into an aggregation mechanism. (e.g. in processes of 
elections or referenda). 
● Democracies place restrictions on state action to guarantee various freedoms, including 
freedom of speech and freedom of association. These regulations encourage the 
development of numerous and diverse information sources.  
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● By their affluent state, we assume a significant portion of the citizenry is literate and 
educated; that information consumption and generation in large volumes plays a key 
role in work, leisure and social lives; and that there can be reasonable expectations from 
the state or between citizens about time and resources individuals have to invest in 
gaining more information. 
● By technology-rich we assume the majority of citizens have access to reliable high-
bandwidth internet, smartphones with video cameras, and that many engage with social 
media platforms. 
 
We should also note that within this report we intentionally adopt a government actor’s 
perspective to issues of epistemic security. That is, we choose to “see like a state”.14 However, 
it is important to acknowledge that state priorities or convenience may not always align with the 
interests of the populace. Entities responsible and/or incentivised to ensure epistemic security 
will not always be government actors - indeed, at times government powers may, intentionally 
or otherwise, undermine epistemic security15 - and we acknowledge our present analysis 
suffers by not specifically addressing the perspective of non-government actors as well. Our 
focus on the state level overlooks issues that may arise at different levels of scale (e.g. on 
smaller scales within communities or industries or at larger scales at the regional and global 
levels), and does not explore in depth instances in which non-government entities are the 
primary guardians of epistemic security. We hope future work building on, responding to, or 
inspired by this report  will extend our analysis beyond the current limitations we have imposed. 
2.3.2 Clashing values and informed collective action 
In the remainder of this report we also largely set aside the complex and important issue of how 
to navigate clashing values and preferences in a heterogeneous polity. We acknowledge that 
the separation between information and values is artificial but for the purpose of this report we 
find it useful to discuss information independently. Here we explain why. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that even if the constituents of a decision-making body have 
equitable access to information, it may still be reasonable for the constituent individuals or 
groups to rationally disagree about how to proceed based on that information;16 the values held 
 
14 As described by James C. Scott (1998) an entity ‘sees like a state’ when it develops schemes or 
proposes solutions primarily with a view to state convenience.  
15 For example, the September 2002 dossier published by the British Government presented an 
assessment of Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction. It has been uncovered that some 
assessments made in the report were framed with the goal of strengthening the case for war with Iraq 
(Aimes, 2011). Assessments made in the dossier regarding Iraq’s WMD capabilities and arsenals were 
subsequently found to be incorrect (Comprehensive report of, 2004). 
16 Social epistemologists who write on this topic discuss the epistemic permissibility of rational 
disagreement (Conee 2010, Goldman 2010, Kelp & Douven 2012). 
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by a recipient of information will impact the decision made at the fourth step (evaluating 
information) of epistemic processes as we illustrate in Figure 1. Two examples relating to public 
health are given below. 
 
1. It is widely known that mass vaccination can eradicate diseases (such as polio) or 
provide herd immunity (to diseases like measles, mumps, and rubella, or MMR) if a large 
enough portion of the population is vaccinated. However, despite abundant evidence 
supporting vaccine safety and efficacy, a significant number of people denounce the 
routine vaccination of children.17 While poor information has often been implicated in 
vaccine hesitancy (as we will discuss later in the report), John (2019) argues that even if 
a vaccine-hesitant parent were to accept the scientific evidence pertaining to vaccine 
safety and efficacy, they may still rationally disagree with health officers or government 
officials on the basis of differently held values. For instance, a parent and a public health 
official may both know that MMR vaccines present  a very low risk of adverse health 
effects, however, the public health official is mainly interested in establishing herd 
immunity to MMR in a larger community while the parent is primarily concerned with 
protecting their individual child’s health. Furthermore, given their different goals, they 
may have a different risk tolerance. John argues that if the parent has reason to believe 
that the health official holds different goals and values, then even though they both 
acknowledge the same risks and benefits of vaccination, the parent may rationally 
refuse to vaccinate their child on the health official’s advice.  
 
2. Furman (2020) points out that in the 2013-2016 Ebola crisis in West Africa there was 
high penetration of scientific communication through affected regions. However, in 
some instances, community members also had reason to believe that the values held by 
scientists and medical workers did not align with their own and therefore had reason to 
resist expert advice. For instance, it was common practice that bodies of the deceased 
were not returned to families because they remained highly infectious and community 
burials were a common point of new infection. However, proper community burials were 
linked to beliefs about the fate of the deceased and the fate of communities (e.g. crop 
failure) if not performed. With their reasoning embedded in a different framework of 
values, community members often had good reasons to resist the efforts of health 
workers by performing secret burials or refusing to hand over contact tracing 
information until proper burial arrangements had been made.   
 
17 The adoption of vaccination campaigns around the world is a complex issue, involving cases of unsafe 
vaccines (Arkin 2019), fake vaccine campaigns used to cover up intelligence work (Kennedy 2017), 
religious beliefs (Navin 2017; Wombwell et al. 2014), and many others. However, in affluent democracies 
a recent movement against MMR vaccines seems to relate more to communities that refuse to vaccinate 
children despite abundant scientific evidence pertaining to vaccine safety and efficacy. 
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Overall, it is important to appreciate that even when high quality information is equitably 
available to and consumed by decision-makers and actors, misalignment of values means 




Clashing values in a health crisis: An example from workshop scenario 1 & 
COVID-19 
 
In workshop scenario 1 a health crisis of an unknown source sweeps across the world. 
Official national organisations seek to reassure their populations, provide informed advice 
and guidance to keep their populations safe, and take action to address the crisis. The 
populations want to know how to stay safe. They seek information and guidance tailored to 
their situation: 
 
Assume that all population members acquire true and reliable information about the health 
crisis. This outcome is very unlikely for reasons described throughout the rest of this report, 
but we here want to highlight  that equally well-informed individuals may still rationally 
disagree on the proper course of action in response to a crisis due to value prioritisation.  
 
The recent COVID-19 crisis provides a prime example. Complete social lockdown focuses 
on reducing threat to life of a vulnerable subpopulation from COVID-19 by reducing the 
spread of the virus, but lockdown measures can also increase risk to life from other causes 
(e.g. depression and suicide rates may increase due, for example, to job loss or social 
isolation) and threaten economic prosperity. Individuals can balance these risks differently 
and may have a hard time reconciling their different roles and values. For example one 
individual may be an owner of a small business, a school governor and care provider for 
older relatives and be torn between economic and familial interests. Different people with 
different value priorities (or the same individual with multiple value priorities) may be well-
informed but still have rational grounds for disagreeing about appropriate guidelines for 
controlling COVID-19 .  
 
 
The disruptive influence of unaligned values on timely decision-making and effective collective 
action in a democratic society will always be a challenge, but this must not only be looked upon 
negatively. Social epistemologists point out that exposure to diverse viewpoints and critique is 
central to encouraging epistemic modesty, careful deliberation, and well-considered judgments 
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(Holst & Molander 2017; Sunstein & Hastie 2015). Toward this end, modern communication 
technologies might be expected to bolster a society’s potential for sound decision-making by 
facilitating the free exchange of opinions and the public critique of information and information 
sources.  
 
However, many of the benefits of disagreement from clashing values is lost if the differing 
constituents also base their arguments on false information. While value (mis)alignment 
between actors has a strong influence on collective decision-making, in this report we focus on 
the prerequisite of reliable and timely information being available to all constituents. This leads 
us to focus on how emerging communication technologies can facilitate the malicious or 
accidental manipulation of information, overwhelm user capacities to process and filter 
information, asymmetrically emphasize minority extremist viewpoints and suppress 
marginalized voices, and make it more difficult for information recipients to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of information sources.  
 
3. Analysing Epistemic Security 
Through the development and analysis of epistemic security scenarios, we have found common  
themes that help frame and tease apart the myriad challenges in this space. In this section we 
draw on existing literature to provide an initial framework for analysing epistemic systems and 
vulnerabilities. In section 4 we outline how this framework can be used in practice to analyse a 
specific scenario of concern, building on the methodologies used in the workshops. 
 
Section 3.1 first looks at the pathway from information production to informed collective action 
and at the four main knowledge sources discussed in classic epistemology: experience, 
memory, reason, and testimony. These provide a useful framing for the impact of technology on 
the supply-side and distribution of decision-guiding information. In Appendix 3 we show how 
these also provide a useful framing for novel epistemic vulnerabilities introduced by new 
technologies. 
 
We then look at four key aspects of epistemic vulnerabilities: adversaries and blunderers, 
attention scarcity and bounded rationality, insular communities and group polarisation, and 
fabrication and erosion of trust. While these headings all interact with each other in important 
ways, they provide useful perspectives with which to analyse potential and unfolding crisis 
scenarios. Each helps to draw out important details and nuances that matter for effective 
intervention. In appendix 3 we show how these aspects can help frame suggested epistemic 
security interventions. 
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3.1 From information production to informed collective action 
In the scenarios developed in the workshop, significant social harms emerged from either 
misinformed collective action (e.g. in scenario 5 - xenophobic ethnic cleansing) or from a failure 
to coordinate informed collective action (e.g. in scenario 1 - global health crisis).  
 
To identify the source of disruption in light of failed collective action (real-world or hypothetical), 
we find it conceptually useful to break down the steps in the epistemic processes leading from 
information production to informed collective action, as outlined in Fig. 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Epistemic process feeds collective decision making and coordinated action 
 
This depiction of an admittedly simplified step-wise process makes clear this report's 
assumption that access to true information is a key driver in informed collective action through 
the crucial step of coordinated decision-making. In an epistemically secure society, if all 
decision-makers - official decision-making bodies and members of society - have access to the 
same true information , then it would seem that informed collective action should ensue. (This 
assumes of course that we set aside the influence of conflicting values that will be present in 
any heterogeneous population - see section 2.3.2) For example, if all relevant decision-making 
bodies were to have access to the same reliable information about trends and causes of climate 
change, then deliberative processes should lead to an agreement that significant steps must be 
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taken to mitigate the crisis. But given the  limited degree of agreed societal action on climate 
change (or other real world examples that our scenarios draw on), we infer that the failure to 
coordinate and act implies that something goes wrong in the information → decision → action 
process which suggests that our society is not epistemically secure. The stepwise process 
allows us to zoom in at particular steps where epistemic vulnerabilities may be present.  
 
We start our analysis with information production. In contemporary technology-rich societies 
information is abundant. To emphasise the abundance of information production and to 
elucidate the role that technology plays in enabling this abundance, we find it useful to refer to 
the four main sources of knowledge presented in traditional epistemology: experience, 
memory, reason and testimony. Contemporary societies contain numerous specialised roles 
and institutions for creating and sharing information via these conduits, and modern technology 
plays a significant part in mediating and improving human access to each knowledge source. In 
philosophical literature such technologies are often referred to as epistemic enhancers as they 
augment or improve human perceptual and cognitive capabilities.18  
 
Experience 
People gain knowledge from experience by observing the world for themselves. 
Recent advances in technology have improved our ability to gather and retain 
experiential knowledge. There are now more people alive than ever before, and 
many of them are equipped with devices that can capture experiences directly in 
accurate and persistent formats (e.g. mobile phone video recordings). There are 
also a very large number of devices that can capture records of events without 
human presence, including satellites, CCTV cameras, Internet of Things, and 
computer and network logs.  
Memory 
Closely related to experiential knowledge is knowledge from memory. People 
can file away knowledge they have acquired via experience (or the other 
knowledge sources) to draw upon at a later time. Digital technology enables the 
creation and curation of extremely large repositories of "memories" that can be 
easily and rapidly retrieved with perfect fidelity. 
 
18 Term coined by Paul Humphreys (2004) in Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, 
and Scientific Method. 
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Reason 
Knowledge from reason is acquired by deducing truths about the world from a 
more basic set of information such as physical laws or well-established facts. For 
example, scientists, analysts and other "knowledge workers" reason about 
information to generate new insights about the world. Specialised languages 
and technologies help extend the ways that such reasoning can be explicated 
and shared with others, such as advanced data visualization tools that leverage 
our ability to digitise vision and sound to produce conceptual representations. In 
addition, we also have algorithmic and automated approaches to information 
distillation, pattern extraction and anomaly detection, enabling machines to 
derive knowledge with little human input. 
Testimony 
Testimonial knowledge is knowledge acquired from the reports of other people. 
Every time a person consults a book, searches the web, or attends a lecture, she 
acquires knowledge via testimony. Without testimony, each new generation 
would have to relearn all the facts known to previous generations, and human 
collaboration on a scale that builds civilization and sends rockets to the moon 
would be impossible. Modern information technologies make testimonial 
knowledge easily accessible to vast populations by connecting more people at 
higher speeds than ever before and by providing individuals with abundant 
sources of information. For example, one of the world's largest companies, 
Google Inc has as its mission statement "to organize the world's information and 
make it universally accessible and useful", and many of its products (e.g. Search, 
Books, Scholar, Sites, YouTube) increase the access of uncensored internet 
users to testimonial knowledge sources. 
 
However, while information-mediating technologies enable the mass production and 
distribution of information to broad audiences, there remains a significant challenge in 
minimizing the production of unreliable information, in differentiating between reliable 
information from trustworthy sources (which, if true, would constitute knowledge) and 
unreliable information from untrustworthy sources, and in eliciting decision-guiding information 
equitably from diverse communities. In particular, there is a deficit of robust and epistemically 
valid pathways for historically marginalised voices to be expressed and attended to.19 
 
 
19 AIDS activism in the 1980’s United States provides a classic illustration of the extreme difficulty with 
which epistemic “outsiders” gain credibility within epistemic communities with established social norms 
and institutional structures (Epstein 1995). 
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As we describe throughout the following section, modern technologies can exacerbate 
challenges to epistemic security in various ways along the pathway from knowledge production 
to decision-making and action. In the next section we describe different sources of vulnerability 
in an epistemic system, each providing a useful perspective to understand what is going wrong 
in the scenarios we explored.  
 
3.2  Themes of vulnerabilities in social epistemic infrastructures 
As life becomes more complex, as society becomes more interconnected, and as decisions 
become more distributed (as our social epistemic infrastructures become more complicated), it 
becomes increasingly difficult to ensure that reliable information is uniformly available and 
readily accessible throughout society. Sources of epistemic threats and vulnerabilities - from 
state-run disinformation campaigns to cognitive biases of elected decision makers - are too 
numerous to list. (Indeed, awareness of the many such threats and vulnerabilities is rapidly 
evolving as is highlighted in related works - section 2.2). Here we consider four themes of 
technologically-exacerbated vulnerabilities and threats that present challenges to the 
maintenance of epistemically secure societies:   
 
● Action by adversaries and blunderers 
● Attention scarcity and bounded rationality 
● Insular communities and group polarization 
● Fabrication and erosion of trust 
 
We note that these themes do not constitute mutually exclusive groupings of epistemic 
vulnerabilities and threats; they interact and feedback in numerous ways. Nonetheless, in the 
analysis of the scenarios developed in the workshops, we have found it useful to tease out 
these four themes and work through them in turn, as each highlights and emphasises different 
aspects of a social epistemic infrastructure and its technologically influenced dynamics. 
3.2.1 Adversaries and Blunderers 
Decision-guiding information is frequently modified or manipulated by third parties. When 
information manipulation is intended to deceive, mislead or confuse, it is considered an 
‘adversarial attack’ against knowledge acquisition and distribution processes. For instance, a 
political actor or foreign power may modify or fabricate news stories or misrepresent a 
politician’s comments in order to undermine a presidential campaign. We label the instigating 
actors of such attacks as adversaries.  
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On the other hand, actions that bring information recipients to false or poorly supported beliefs 
can also be well-intentioned or accidental. For example, a vaccine researcher wary of side 
effects and distrustful of medical authority might make a well-meaning but slightly alarmist 
comment during an interview, which could then be picked up and spread by an online 
community of parents, instigating a widespread anti-vaccination campaign. We label the 
instigators of such accidental or well-intended interferences as blunderers.  
 
Mal-intended adversarial actions meant to disrupt and/or hijack knowledge-acquisition and 
decision-making processes and the accidental or well-intended interference of blunderers can 
not be strictly delineated. The moral distinction between warranted and unwarranted 
information manipulation is fuzzy at best, and so there is a continuum from epistemic 
adversaries to blunderers who engage in a spectrum of activities (Figure 3). For the purpose of 
systematically analysing epistemic security we find it less useful to focus on the intention 
behind epistemic system interference, and highlight instead the possible negative 
consequences of certain activities on our epistemic systems. 
 
  
Figure 3: The spectrum from epistemic blunderers to adversaries 
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As many of the works mentioned in the introduction highlight, the actions of adversaries and 
blunderers in our heavily technologically mediated system of knowledge production and 
dissemination makes our current epistemic situation precarious. Whether we are threatened by 
state-sponsored disinformation operations, corporate propaganda aiming to sow doubt, 
criminals seeking to extort or exploit, curious hackers keen to explore new technologies, or 
merely unwitting social media users, it has arguably never been easier to intentionally or 
accidentally undermine the functioning of our social epistemic infrastructure. Several factors 
enabled or exacerbated by new technologies contribute to the increased threat of adversarial or 
accidental influence to our epistemic systems: 
● Global connectivity: New communication technologies and platforms allow 
(mis/dis)information to travel more widely and quickly than ever before.  
● Lack of accountability: The global community is often unable to meaningfully attribute or 
prosecute malicious acts against epistemic security - and is therefore unable to deter 
such malicious acts - when these are carried out through digital or autonomous means. 
● Social visibility: The social network structure and epistemic norms of online 
communities, and the digital behaviours of individuals (including through their 
membership of multiple online communities) produce highly visible traces which make 
these groups and their individual members more susceptible to effective targeting with 
specific content (e.g. advertising, political opinions, but also disinformation). 
● Automation: The ability to automate, or leverage existing automation of, cognitively 
demanding activities such as targeting (compare informer networks to facebook's 
targeted ads), experimenting (compare focus groups to automated A/B testing), and 
content crafting (consider recent remarkable developments in image, audio and text 
synthesis) significantly reduces the cost and allows a massive scaling up of the 
production of (mis/dis)information, the targeting of this information at the most 
receptive individuals, and distribution of targeted and tailored messages to massive 
global audiences. 
● Financial Incentives: The technical ability of digital platforms to measure, in real-time, 
interactions between individual users and individual content items such as a single 
news story or advertisement, has enabled the creation of business models around 
specific engagement metrics (for example click-through rate or CTR), which in many 
cases has led to the prioritisation of these metrics. Divisive, controversial or otherwise 
emotionally gripping content performs well on such metrics, not only by maximising 
user engagement but also through increasing the likelihood of subsequent sharing, 
propagating the message on the network and increasing engagement for other users. 
This dynamic creates a perverse financial incentive for digital platforms to limit their 
restriction of (mis/dis)information. 
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Furthermore, in liberal democracies all of these factors operate against a legal and political 
background that limits the ability of the state to restrict speech except in very narrow domains. 
Consequently, new technologies increase the threat posed by adversarial actors or blunderers 
to our systems of knowledge acquisition and information exchange. Adversaries and 
blunderers may generate fake content outright, or they may merely selectively repackage 
truthful anecdotes to generate misinformation. They may either intend to cause harm or act 
selfishly, or they may believe themselves to be acting in society's best interest. Regardless of 
the exact method or motivation, the study of ongoing or hypothetical future crisis scenarios 
should include careful consideration of adversarial efforts and blunderer interference. Based on 
our understanding of current trends, these threats are likely to become increasingly destructive 
to our epistemic systems as information technologies evolve. 
Box 3.2.1 a 
Adversaries engage in political character assassination  (Workshop scenario 2) 
 
In this scenario, a politically motivated group undertakes a long term strategy to undermine 
future political leaders of a rival government. A group of ‘potential future leaders’ is identified 
and a whole ‘fake history’ is created for each individual as they progress through their 
careers. The plan is that once these individuals become influential, some of the fake facts 
about their early lives can be used to manipulate their actions either overtly or subliminally. 
This influence could be achieved in a number of ways: 
● Traditional blackmail either for money, as a way of financing terrorist acts, or to make 
them behave in a way that they would not otherwise have done (voting for example); 
● Simply distracting their attention at a political or economic crisis point so that chaos 
ensues; 
● Releasing what would by then be authenticatable historic information, in order to 
undermine their credibility and force a resignation or other desired outcome. 
 
Such elaborate character assassination planning is enabled by the availability of cheap data 
storage, and the technology to allow photographs and documents to be believably tampered 
with. The ability and foresight to create fake documents at the appropriate time (e.g. a picture 




3.2.2 Attention Scarcity and Bounded Rationality  
When a decision maker is confronted by a quantity of information that is greater than her 
cognitive capacities can handle, she experiences an information overload; she finds herself 
in 20 or 30 years’ time) adds to the authenticity of the spurious information, as does the 
creation of a holistic story involving multiple event and associates. This opens up a variety of 
opportunities which could enable the subversion of the political process, or create enough 
confusion to reduce the ability to deal effectively with a set of simultaneous crises. 
 
 
Box 3.2.1 b  
Blunders cause economic collapse (Workshop scenario 4) 
 
In this hypothetical scenario, financial professionals make profit-driven decisions which are 
quite lucrative in the short term, but in the long run have the unintentional consequence of 
leading to financial system failure and economic collapse: 
 
A highly competitive culture within the financial industry, and its focus on short-term gain, 
leads the industry to create narrow AI code that lacks proper validation and verification and 
which makes short-term gain decisions. Financial professionals, driven by profit, encourage 
the short-term gain culture. They also begin to advise investors to rely on crypto-currencies. 
The expectation that commodity has value underpins the international financial system. As a 
result dependence on crypto-currencies, which are not linked to any tangible asset nor 
supported by any national government, threatens that system. International regulation by the 
financial authorities, designed to keep a financial system based on commodities with value 
stable, fails to adapt sufficiently quickly to the new models of financial dealing driven by the 
use of crypto-currency. Before the authorities can enact international controls on these new 
models, investors suddenly lose faith in a specific crypto-currency when its technical 
underpinning is compromised. They attempt to realise the capital it represented in large 
numbers. The crypto-currency cannot deliver and this leads to the disintegration of other 
financial models linked to it. As investors have traded real commodities using crypto-
currency, this undermines the currency of countries which invested real money in the 
production of those commodities. Traditional financial models therefore also begin to break 
down, leading to a failure of most parts of the financial system and economic collapse. 
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overwhelmed by an excessive amount of information. This is not a new phenomenon. As Ann 
Blair (2012) points out, as early as the thirteenth century, scholars have complained that “the 
multitude of books, the shortness of time and the slipperiness of memory” can overwhelm the 
human intellect. However in more recent times the emergence of information technologies, 
particularly internet services, have exacerbated the issue, making larger quantities of additional 
information more easily accessible to larger populations of decision-makers than ever before 
(Roetzel 2019). 
 
In his book Designing Organisations for an Information Rich World, Herbert Simon (1971) points 
out that in an abundant information environment the most limiting factor to human information 
processing is the human capacity for attention.20 As Simon explains, humans are serial 
processors that can effectively attend to only one item at any given time, and their time is 
limited. Consequently, the rapid increase in available information and information channels has 
led to the emergence of a competitive “attention economy” in which information-providing 
organisations must compete for the limited attention of their audiences.  
 
As such, information providers are incentivised to invest heavily in strategies to make their 
information products more attention grabbing. For information creators, a competitive attention 
economy exerts a pressure to create content that is sensational, that can be rapidly consumed, 
and that is emotively charged, that relates to a person's identity or group affiliation, and that 
affirms previously held beliefs.  
 
While these pressures have always existed in the media environment, there are now much 
better tools available to content creators to attract and measure audience engagement. For 
example, digital platforms focus on developing intuitive interfaces that facilitate rapid 
engagement with content (e.g. by making information and options easy to find). If it takes a user 
too much time or effort to locate information that holds their interest, they are likely to switch 
platforms. Similarly, search engines prioritise and filter recommendations by relevance, and 
content aggregators such as news or social media feeds prioritise items to target user interest. 
Such prioritisation and filtering is known to rely on many factors, including past user behaviour 
(on and off the platform), the user's social networks (as expressed by "connecting" to other 
users) and group membership, stated demographic information, and expressed preferences. 
The same tools and strategies used to deliver engaging content are also used to deliver 
engaging advertisements. As advertisements often provide the main revenue source for such 
platforms, there is a strong incentive to invest in and perfect attention-grabbing methods.  
 
 
20  For Simon an information rich world is one characterised by computer-based information processing 
and xerox copying machines, but we may now add a host of internet-enabled communication 
technologies. 
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Attention-grabbing strategies employed by information creators and on information distribution 
platforms can be epistemically problematic for several reasons.21  
First, the methods employed by information distributors to prioritise attention-grabbing content 
are not reliable indicators of the truth value or contextual usefulness of the information being 
promoted. The methods employed by information creators and distributors to attract attention - 
such as content personalization and targeting techniques and visual presentation - are truth-
neutral; they help perpetuate information irrespective of whether it is true or false, informative 
or misleading.  
Second, the commitment of resources to truth-oriented activities such as fact checking and 
double sourcing are disincentivised. Because the attention economy is fiercely competitive, 
information creators and distributors are incentivized to commit more resources to attention 
grabbing strategies. In turn, fewer resources can be committed to employing strategies that 
aim to ensure the distribution of reliable information. In other words, in a competitive attention 
economy there is an implicit penalty for information creators and distributors who wish to 
engage in the perpetuation of reliable information. The quality of prevalent information is 
therefore likely to decrease.     
Finally, the competitive pressures of attention scarcity also implies that methods for drawing 
consumer attention must evolve rapidly for information providers to achieve and maintain an 
edge over competitors. In turn, a quickly changing information environment may leave 
consumers behind in terms of their ability to discern which information sources are most 
trustworthy, undermining efforts by consumers to prioritise truth-oriented information sources. 
We speak more about trust in technologically-mediated information sources in section 3.3.4. 
 
While on the information supply and distribution side there is fierce competition for scarce 
attention. To further the challenge, on the information consumption side there is also growing 
empirical evidence that humans are not fully rational about what information they choose to 
consume. Various decision heuristics and biases affect what information people attend to 
 
21 Information processing technologies may also help in reducing the cognitive effort required to filter out 
irrelevant information. For example, Landhuis (2016) describes how academic communities curated on 
social networks like Facebook and Twitter and searchable and preference-learning literature databases 
like Google Scholar and Academia can help individuals significantly narrow the pool of publications to 
which they lend their attention, a necessity given that academic databases are experiencing exponential 
yearly growth (http://blogs.nature.com/news/2014/05/global-scientific-output-doubles-every-nine-
years.html). However, while significant technological advancements have been made in computer-based 
summarisation, filtering, and information network curation, these advances still lag behind the growth of 
information databases and the growing demand for high-quality, context-appropriate information. For 
instance, Landhuis notes that despite the aid of technological advances in academic resource curation, 
academics spend 6-8 hours a week curating their own information resources. In many cases, an overly 
burdensome and cognitively demanding amount of information processing must still be conducted by 
human decision-makers, and the challenge of information overload persists.  
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(Kahneman 2011). In particular, humans are naturally prone to confirmation bias; they are more 
willing to attend to, and more likely to believe, information that confirms their pre-held beliefs 
(Klayman 1995) or which they have seen before (Kahneman 2011). Attention grabbing 
strategies such as the targeting of user interests on social media sites and advertisements 
consequently encourage the development of filter bubbles and echo chambers in which 
individuals consume information that primarily serves to bolster their existing opinions and 
beliefs. This information is not necessarily true or well-evidenced (See section 3.3.3 for an 
extended discussion on echo chambers and opinion polarisation).  
 
Furthermore, not only are humans biased in their allocation of scarce attention, they also 
imperfectly rationalize about the information they do consume. They suffer from what Simon 
(1957) calls bounded rationality. Perfect rationality in decision-making requires that a person 
has access to complete information about the options available to her, has perfect foresight 
about the consequences of those options, and the cognitive capacity to process this 
information and optimize her decision accordingly. Rarely, if ever, do any of these conditions 
obtain, but they define a more well-reasoned individual (though her rationality is bounded) as 
one who more closely approaches the ideal criteria for perfect rationality. Given this ideal, it is 
clear why a competitive attention landscape is problematic: it limits a decision-maker’s access 
to information regarding available options which in turn limits her ability to reason well about 
those options. The goal of attention grabbing strategies are not to inform a decision-maker 
about the pros and cons of all her options, but to focus her gaze in one direction or another. 
 
Overall, our competitive and technologically-enabled attention economy presents less than 
ideal conditions for well-reasoned decision-making. Information providers prioritize eye-
catching appeal over veracity, diversity, and informativity, and human decision-makers are 
overwhelmed by information curated with little regard to its orientation to truth. 
3.2.3  Insular Communities and Group Polarisation 
The communities we belong to and identify with have a strong influence over our belief 
formation and knowledge acquisition processes. As described in Kusch's (2002) Knowledge by 
Agreement, this is true even within the most "scientific" and "rational" communities. 
 
In the context of epistemic security, community norms play a role in setting shared 
commitments to beliefs or belief formation processes, the bundling of beliefs, the willingness to 
trust members who share similar beliefs (or mistrust those who hold differing beliefs), and the 
role of influencers and network topology in belief formation in groups (O’Connor and Weatherall 
2019; Urban 2019). 
 
30 
Community thinking and group collaboration can be of great epistemic benefit to society. No 
individual holds all the knowledge or working capacity to achieve great organisational feats. 
Knowledge transfer via testimony in combination with the organisational structure provided by 
a community - such as productive divisions of labour or the necessary outsourcing of tasks - 
enables the greatest of human achievements (Anderson & Wagenknecht 2013; Malone 2018; 
Wray 2002). 
 
Information acquisition from another person (through testimony) often relies on evaluating the 
communities to which that person belongs. Established community norms and structures help 
to ensure the trustworthiness of individual community members as sources of information. For 
example, Heather Douglas (2017) argues that we have good reason to trust that individual 
scientists are reliable sources of information if those scientists are members of a ‘well-
functioning epistemic community’. Following on the work of social epistemologist Helen 
Longino (2002), Douglas considers a well-functioning epistemic community to be one in which 
the following conditions hold: 
● there are platforms and avenues for dissenting opinions and criticism to be voiced,  
● criticism is taken seriously,  
● diverse viewpoints are considered equitably.  
 
If a scientist is a member of a community that follows these epistemic codes of conduct, 
Douglas suggests, then it is reasonable to believe that the scientist is also held to these same 
standards. Accordingly, we may trust an individual scientist to be a reliable source of 
information in her field of expertise if the community of scientists to which she belongs is a 
well-functioning epistemic community.  
 
However, community-mediated reasoning can also have negative epistemic consequences. 
Like individuals, insular groups suffer from conformity bias which inhibits the consideration of 
external viewpoints and new evidence that run counter to the group’s preconceived beliefs. In 
turn, conformity bias taken to the extreme may result in community polarisation or 
radicalisation in which groups that initially differ slightly in opinion on a particular issue move to 
strongly disagree (Sunstein 2007). This change is largely a response to cultural or ideological 
differences between groups, and each community ignores or neglects outside viewpoints to 
maintain an identity independent of “the other” (Whitaker, 2018). The issue is exacerbated 
because extremely large, highly-visible, or well-connected epistemic communities (e.g. the 
activist wing of a political movement, the followers of a popular brand, or the members of a 
majority religion) also attract a disproportionate amount of attention. Consequently the 
viewpoints presented by these groups are often assigned more epistemic weight even though 
the size of a community or the community’s ability to disseminate information publicly is not a 
clear indication of the community's epistemic rigour or the truth-value of the community’s 
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claims. It is all too easy for outsized importance to be placed on the opinions of mass 
movements on the one hand, or on the opinion of minority radical groups with high connectivity 
and effective strategies for drawing attention. However, neither the number of supporters nor 
the loudness of their support make a claim more true. 
 
Emerging technologies amplify the epistemic processes of communities. In well-functioning 
epistemic communities, technology can help identify diverse voices and increase the evidence 
and rigour with which they are evaluated. However, in poorly-functioning epistemic 
communities technology can lead to silencing, groupthink, radicalisation and polarisation. The 
dynamics by which these take place are discussed below. 
 
To start on a positive note, a general trend of technology has been to provide more ways in 
which to create and manage communities (Shadbolt et al. 2019). Communities require an 
infrastructure with which to communicate, and the emergence of new communication 
technologies facilitates the formation of new, larger, and more complex yet efficient epistemic 
communities and inter-/intra- community collaborations. For examples, global connectivity has 
allowed the creation of one-to-many and many-to-many communications networks connecting 
billions of individuals in different parts of the world (e.g. social networks), topic-based-tagging 
has enabled the fluid formation of topic-based communities, and video streaming platforms 
have enabled many more individuals to build communities around their unique content and 
personas (Day, 2015). In general, technology companies have been encouraging the creation of 
communities on their platforms.22 
 
If used well, information technologies and social media platforms in particular can help build 
and maintain epistemically well-functioning communities that encourage the expression of 
diverse viewpoints and that are receptive to criticism. For example, new information 
technologies provide platforms for minority opinions and critical viewpoints to be easily voiced, 
which, if integrated with and scrutinised alongside mainstream opinions in a rigorous manner, 
lead to better decision-making. Furthermore, many online community platforms provide tools 
that allow community moderators to manage group membership and content, which can be 
used to promote positive epistemic norms such as rigour and openness. For example, 
reputation or “karma” systems are used to reward or punish members with greater or lesser 
 
22 Digital platforms do not enable community formation merely out of goodwill. Users prefer to be on the 
same platform as their friends and colleagues, or other people they consider to be "part of their 
community". This is an example of the network effect, whereby the value of a product or service increases 
with the number of users or participants. This in large part explains the dominance of a few platforms in 
every niche, and the competition between platforms to appeal to communities that are not well-served by 
existing alternatives. It also partially explains why users are often reluctant to abandon a platform even 
when there are serious misgivings about its practices and impacts, unless such abandonment can be 
coordinated en masse.  
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visibility and moderation powers according to their alignment with community standards.23 At 
their core, such systems are important for maintaining the quality of discussion and reliability of 
information created and shared by a community. An example of a system that enforces 
epistemic standards is the peer review process used by the majority of  academic communities 
to reward individuals who adhere to community defined standards of good methodology, 
objectivity, and academic rigour with the publication of their work (greater visibility) while 
minimizing the visibility of statements that fail to meet standards of rigour or are suspect due to 
a conflict of interests.24 
 
However, while new technologies can and do facilitate the establishment and maintenance of 
diverse and reliable epistemic communities, they also enable (and sometimes incentivise)  
epistemically detrimental community practices. For instance, while social media platforms can 
help give a voice to critical, underrepresented, or marginalised views, such platforms can also 
be flooded (by adversaries or blunderers) with poorly-reasoned radical opinions, held by few, to 
make them seem much more prevalent and widely accepted than they actually are. As Asch 
(1951) observed, individuals are much more likely to accept and echo majority community 
views, even if they personally hold evidence that contradicts those views. Similarly, karma 
systems that can help enforce good epistemic standards can also be hijacked to ostracize and 
silence individuals deemed ‘unwelcome’ or ‘undesirable’ for non-epistemic reasons, 
diminishing the diversity of views in a community and undermining its quality of reasoning. It is 
important to keep these knock-on effects in mind. 
 
Because the tools provided by social media platforms are agnostic to the epistemic standards 
promoted by each community, and due to confirmation bias and other psychological and social 
tendencies, the communities that use such platforms to engage in critical rigorous discussion 
and consider minority views fairly are the exception rather than the norm. Rather, such 
platforms enable communities to follow their biases and develop into insular echo chambers for 
opinions that align with the pre-held beliefs of the members or moderators. Such insular 
communities are largely deaf, and at times aggressively opposed, to criticism or opposition. As 
a result, individuals embedded in these communities will often be unaware of or unable to 
access information which is important to good decision-making and informed collective action.  
 
23 For example, a user that contributes content that other users find interesting or insightful may gain the 
power to remove offensive or unhelpful content posted by other users, close off discussions, or to block 
users that violate a site's policy. 
24 It should be noted that the academic peer review system is far from perfect, and the critique and 
continuous development of the system is part of what makes certain scientific communities well-
functioning epistemically. In particular, digital technologies have enabled new ways for disseminating and 
responding to scientific findings (in particular via electronic preprints), and the formation of norms and 




Because technology has made participation in online communities easier than ever, because 
the majority of online communities fail to meet the rigorous standards of well-run epistemic 
communities (as characterised by Longino and Douglas), and because these communities and 
their poor epistemic practices are persistent, the overall impact of technology on community 
epistemology has created significant challenges to epistemic security. It is important to note, 
however, that the creation of epistemic echo chambers on individual platforms does not 
necessarily preclude individuals from accessing diverse sources of information across a range 
of platforms and media. Information technology has enabled a very rich media ecosystem that 
allows people to easily join numerous communities, which may all contribute information and a 
variety of perspectives to a person’s decision-making processes.25 However, the challenge still 
remains, individuals have to be self-motivated to overcome their confirmation biases, and then 
actively challenge the biases of their communities and information sources, while maintaining a 
rich and balanced "information diet". While this may work for some, and indeed leaves some 





Xenophobic Polarisation (Workshop scenario 5) 
 
In this scenario a far right xenophobic faction wishes to force the departure of a specific 
ethnic community and pursues its goal by spreading false information about the ethic group:  
 
The far right faction’s controlling group decides on a strategy of implicating the ethnic 
community in a chemical or biological attack. The aim is to turn public opinion against the 
ethnic community so much that extreme violence against the ethnic group will be considered 
justifiable by elements of the population. First, the far right faction uses AI-enabled 
technologies to identify (target) individual members of society who are most likely to 
sympathize with the group’s xenophobic inclinations. The radical group then stages the 
chemical/biological attack, and uses AI-enabled communication technology to push 
messages at speed and scale to likely sympathizers claiming that the specific ethnic 
community is responsible for the attack. The sympathisers continue to share the radical 
group’s messages among themselves and with other like-minded individuals. Elements of the 
targeted population then mobilise, arm themselves and use violence to drive out the ethnic 
community.  The far right faction has achieved its objective.  
34 
of time and resources that cannot be afforded by many, even in affluent and technology-rich 
societies. 
3.2.4 Fabrication and Erosion of Trust 
Evaluating the trustworthiness or reliability of an information source is often central to justifying 
the use of information as the basis for further decision-making and action. This is particularly 
the case when acquiring information from reports provided by other people (i.e. from testimony)  
Because the information recipient does not observe, rationally derive, or remember a piece of 
testimonial information for herself, she cannot directly verify the veracity of the source’s claim. 
Instead she relies on indirect indications of speaker trustworthiness that are more easily 
accessible - she swaps cautious, evidence-based evaluations of information source reliability 
for quick heuristic evaluations.  
 
As explained in Onora O'Neill's (2018) Linking Trust to Trustworthiness, decisions about who to 
trust draw on three components:  
● evaluating the source's reliability  
● evaluating the competence of the source  
● evaluating the source's honesty or sincerity  
Each of the three could be evaluated based on different aspects of the source’s past track 
record. However, track records are not always available or easily accessible, and they do not 
necessarily guarantee future good performance. Instead, information recipients may look for 
signs of competence or expertise. For instance, a person might look to the source’s credentials 
or certifications or ask whether the source is a member of a community that holds its members 
to certain standards of epistemic conduct. Alternatively, a person can look for indications of 
biases, intentions, or underlying motivations which may drive an information source to be 
(dis)honest or (in)sincere in her communications. For example, physicians who accept 
significant amounts of research funding from a pharmaceutical company may be more likely to 
push specific medication to treat a malady, and may be less trustworthy than physicians who 
are not in receipt of such funds. 
 
This quick heuristic approach to evaluating the trustworthiness of sources of human testimony 
is imperfect but useful. Trust is necessary to the success of any instance of communication, 
collaboration, or delegation. Without a willingness to trust one another and to believe 
information provided by others, society would cease to function. Therefore, despite its fallibility, 
the quick heuristic strategy for evaluating the trustworthiness of testimonial speakers has 




However, our indirect methods of evaluating the trustworthiness of human testimony are 
sometimes ill-adapted in a technology-rich environment, leaving them vulnerable to 
manipulation. Relevant technologies include testimony-mediating technologies such as search 
engines and recommender systems on social media platforms, and arguably testimony-
generating technologies such as natural language generation systems and other synthetic 
media sources that generate and modify information by automated means. 
 
Such information-mediating technologies help to make testimonial knowledge more accessible 
and widely distributed. However, these technologies also make it easier to manipulate user 
trust by making it easier to hijack the indirect proxies for trustworthiness that people use to 
decide whether or not to rely upon a source of information. For example, machine learning-
enabled natural language processing (NLP) and natural language understanding (NLU) systems 
may be used to identify and mimic speech patterns or vocal tones that users respond to 
positively in order to gain user trust regardless of the truth-value of the speech content. On this 
topic Matt Chessen (2017) warns that in the near future NLP/NLU-enabled systems will 
produce content indistinguishable from that produced by humans and will much more 
efficiently target receptive readers with tailored content. If these systems are being used to 
sway public opinion or drive decision-makers to specific action, the upset parties will likely 
develop their own NLP/NLU-enabled adversaries to push back. Chessen cautions that an arms 
race to control information will result in a future infosphere dominated by “machines talking to 
machines” and human observers will struggle to know where to turn to inform their decisions.  
 
Regina Rini (2019) makes a similar point with regard to our reliance on photographic media. 
Humans are instinctively inclined to accept photographs or videos as perceptual evidence of 
the content depicted as if the viewer had directly observed the event for herself. However, since 
the development of deepfake technologies, Rini argues that consumers of visual media must 
suppress their instinct to believe what they see, and instead scrutinize the providers of visual 
media as one would a source of spoken or written testimony.   
 
In addition to their ability to hijack trust mechanisms to spread (mis/dis)information, new 
technologies can also be used to undermine trust in individuals and groups. For instance, social 
media platforms can be leveraged to draw large amounts of attention to specific acts or 
statements that undermine a speaker's trustworthiness. Since it is inevitable that at some point 
in time all individuals or communities will make a poor decision or suffer some moral or ethical 
failing, drawing attention to such failings is an efficient way of quickly undermining trust in the 
person or group in question. As trust is slow to build but quick to destroy, drawing attention to 
such failings is an efficient way of quickly undermining trust in the person or group in question. 
In this way, social media consumers can be swayed to mistrust those who may actually be the 
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Epistemic Babble (Workshop scenario 6) & the erosion of trust in experts 
 
In this scenario the ability for the general population to tell the difference between truth and 
fiction (presented as truth) is lost largely due to the widespread use of information mediating 
technologies: 
Although information is easily available, people routinely purport to be other than themselves 
on electronic media and this goes undetected, so people cannot tell whether the information 
they are receiving is reliable or not. For example, social media has allowed people to put 
forward spurious views and for them to be accepted along with the views of true experts as 
being of equal value. This in turn has led to expertise being devalued and people no longer 
respecting or accepting the views of educated and knowledgeable people, or accepting 
authority in any way. 
Additionally the education system relies on digital technologies to radically reduce the 
number of real teachers (without adequate testing of the change) and this results in pupils 
not developing the ability to apply critical thinking to the information that is presented to 
them, without the guidance of an adult. 
The result of this ‘Epistemic Babble’ is that there is an environment of ‘knowledge’ and belief 
that could be easily manipulated. 
 
3.3 The costs of informed collective action 
In section 3.2 we consider four themes of technologically-exacerbated vulnerabilities and 
threats that present challenges to the maintenance of epistemically secure societies:   
 
● Action by adversaries and blunderers 
● Attention scarcity and bounded rationality 
● Insular communities and group polarization 
● Fabrication and erosion of trust 
 
To better understand the combined effects of technologies on epistemic security, and 
subsequently on a society’s capacity for timely decision-making and collective action, we find it 
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useful to think in terms of the costs to information distributors (government actors, experts, 
researchers, adversaries, blunderers, etc.) and consumers of dealing in reliable information. 
These costs are broadly construed as the expenditure of scarce resources (money, time, 
attention etc.) required to produce and distribute information. The various technologies 
described in section 3.2 drive these costs up and down in different ways which can make it 
either more or less difficult for adversaries and blunderers to interfere with an epistemic 
system, and more or less difficult for guardians of epistemic security to intervene. 
 
One category of costs that has received much attention relates to information generation and 
distribution. The costs associated with information production and dissemination have 
dropped significantly with the deployment of modern information producing and mediating 
technologies, leading to information abundance. Lower costs for producing and distributing 
information have made reliable information more easily accessible to a broad audience and 
have also allowed diverse viewpoints, including those of minority and/or marginalised 
communities, to be more easily communicated to a wider population. As discussed above, 
diverse epistemic environments characterized by open communication and critique encourage 
the development of truth-oriented (or epistemically well-functioning (Longino 2002)) and 
epistemically secure societies. 
 
However, since many information distribution channels are truth-neutral, the cost for 
adversaries and blunderers to generate and distribute information which undermines 
informed collective action has also dropped. The costs of information distribution have 
dropped significantly with any-to-all digital communication platforms, and costs of information 
generation are falling with the increasing capability and diffusion of synthetic media generation 
technologies. Furthermore, in democratic societies adversaries and blunderers are afforded 
some protection by freedom of speech legislation and norms which limits government capacity 
to intervene in social epistemic systems.26  
 
The fall of costs for producing [mis/dis]information have highlighted the importance of another 
category of costs: of evaluating the reliability of information sources and of preferentially 
attending to reliable sources. As adversaries and blunderers find it increasingly easy to gain 
attention (e.g. by appealing to community motivated reasoning, by appealing to cognitive 
biases, or by fabricating the appearance of trustworthiness), the costs of identifying 
reliable information sources go up for information consumers. 
 
26While the boundaries set upon governments by freedom of speech legislation prevents the censorship 
of extremist and unverified content, it is important to note that these rules do not require that such content 
be given visibility or reach. Additionally, the US first amendment law does not apply to private US social 
media companies which means they are free to decide what content is allowed and amplified on their 
platforms (Gershan, 2020). Innovations in information technology have contributed to a decrease in the 
costs for adversaries, thus the volume of adverse activity can increase. 
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To complicate matters further, it is not enough for most decision-makers to attend to reliable 
information sources most of the time: for informed collective action, they need to coordinate 
about which sources and topics they attend to in order to create a broad enough basis of 
agreed-upon reliable information around that particular topic. With increasing fragmentation 
and polarisation of epistemic communities as enabled by many online platforms, the costs 
of information coordination also goes up.  
 
Furthermore, the challenge of coordination is often in tension with the challenge of providing a 
platform for all voices. This tension can be misused to intentionally delay or undermine 
consensus by continuously demanding more information, deliberation, and participation before 
action is taken. However, premature closure of discussions also has a harmful effect on society. 
Finding the right balance between open discussion and effective coordination is at the heart of 
epistemic security and needs to be addressed in a context-based manner that appraises the 
factors we list in this report, among others. 
 
These ideas regarding the costs to information distributors and consumers of dealing in reliable 
information are further developed into a preliminary model for understanding the costs of 
maintaining epistemic security in Appendix 4. We note that while these rising costs pose 
challenges for informed collective action, they largely stem from broad improvements in our 
epistemic systems (it is still easier than ever to acquire reliable decision-guiding information): 
they should not be seen as trends to be reversed, but rather as tradeoffs that should be 
carefully addressed. 
 
3.4 Summary of Definitions  
To conclude this section, we summarise the key terms presented in the first half of this report. 
Readers interested in learning more about how specific technologies can be used to undermine 
or bolster epistemic security and collective decision-making processes should look to Appendix 
3. 
 
Decision-making entities are individuals or groups who gather information about the 
world, and use that information to make decisions about how to act in order to achieve 
some goal. In group settings decision-making is more complicated as it requires the 
cooperation of many individuals in some consensus forming process, and coordination 
in acting on group decisions. Collective decision-making and action is further 
complicated when individuals do not have access to the same information on which to 
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base their opinions or when their end goals are informed by different values or 
incentives. 
 
Knowledge/Information sources are the places from which a person or group can 
acquire information on which to base their reasoning and decisions. In traditional 
epistemology the four basic sources of knowledge are experience, memory, reason, and 
testimony, each of which can be influenced by information mediating technologies.  
 
Social Epistemic Infrastructure (Social Epistemic Systems) refers to the collection of 
systems, processes, and actors that influence how knowledge is produced, distributed, 
acquired, modified, and evaluated within a society. Timely group decision-making and 
collective action are reliant upon the strength and efficiency of a society’s epistemic 
infrastructure. 
 
Epistemic communities are groups whose members share and enforce norms of 
knowledge production, distribution, acquisition, modification and evaluation. Such 
norms could be institutionalised, e.g. through a process like peer review, they could be 
codified, e.g. through a list of behaviours that can result in being banned from an online 
forum, or they could be more subtle, e.g. a tendency to engage more with certain topics, 
perspectives or sources while ignoring others. Communities that facilitate the 
contributions of diverse viewpoints and that encourage responsiveness to open critique 
are more likely to be producers of reliable information. 
  
Epistemic security ensures that a community’s processes of knowledge production, 
acquisition, distribution, and coordination are robust to adversarial (or accidental) 
influence. Epistemically secure environments foster efficient and well-informed group 
decision-making which helps decision-makers to better achieve their individual and 
collective goals. 
 
Epistemic threats are factors that interfere with the well-functioning of a society’s 
epistemic processes. 
 
Epistemic vulnerabilities are weak points in a social epistemic infrastructure that are 
most likely to succumb to epistemic threats. 
 
Adversaries interfere with processes of information production, acquisition, evaluation, 
and distribution in a society. In turn, adversarial action adversely affects the ability of 
decision-makers to make well-informed decisions that lead to timely and effective 
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collective action. Adversaries are considered to be individuals or groups who 
intentionally seek to undermine epistemic processes.  
 
Blunderers are individuals or groups that, like adversaries, interfere with information 
processes, but unlike adversaries, their interference is either unintentional or intentional 
but well-meaning. There is a spectrum of actors between adversaries (intentional, 
malicious) and blunderers (unintentional or intentional but well-meaning). 
 
Trust in a source of information is the degree to which a recipient is willing to take the 
information from the source to be true without independently verifying it. 
 
Cost to information distributors (government actors, experts, researchers, adversaries, 
blunderers, etc.) is the expenditure of scarce resources (money, time, attention etc.) 
required to produce and distribute information. The various technologies described in 
section 3.2 drive these costs up and down in different ways which can make it more or 
less difficult for adversaries and blunderers to interfere with an epistemic system and 
more or less difficult for guardians of epistemic security to intervene. Overall, modern 
technology has decreased costs for adversaries and blunderers allowing the volume of 
adverse activity to increase.  
 
The following terms are central to the final section of this report which deals with addressing 
epistemic vulnerabilities and adversarial (or accidental) action in order to maintain or restore a 
society's epistemic security:  
 
Epistemic interventions are actions taken or policies implemented by a regulatory body 
to preserve the epistemic security of a society and thereby preserve the society’s 
capacity for timely and well-informed collective decision making.  
 
Systems-oriented views of epistemic security require stepping back to view all the 
actors, influences, and stakeholders within a social epistemic infrastructure as a whole. 
As we will emphasise in the next section, appropriate and effective epistemic 
interventions can be difficult to identify, requiring a system-oriented view.  
 
Higher-order effects of epistemic interventions include their impacts beyond the 
immediate intended outcomes, for example a creative response by adversaries to new 
legislation. Many interventions, though well-intended, can have both positive and 
negative second- and third-order effects, requiring a systemic and risk-aware 
perspective when interventions are designed and before they are deployed. 
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4. Preliminary recommendations for appraising 
and maintaining epistemic security 
Information-mediating technologies make it easier for a diverse array of information producers 
to generate informational content and distribute it to a wide audience. However, these 
technologies have also lowered the costs for adversaries and blunderers to create and 
distribute misinformation which ends up undermining informed collective action. Various 
epistemic vulnerabilities, including attention scarcity, bounded rationality, fragmentation and 
polarisation of epistemic communities, and the fragility of trust, both challenge informed 
collective action and assist the effectiveness of actions by adversaries and blunderers.  
 
Overall, innovations in information technology have contributed to a decrease in the costs for 
adversaries, and thus the volume of adverse activity can continue to increase. Accordingly, to 
advise government actors (or other guardians of epistemic security - it can not always be 
assumed that a government is interested in maintaining epistemic security instead of 
undermining it) in preserving a society's ability to organise timely and well-informed collective 
action. We present the following recommendations to highlight areas where additional 
research and resources will likely have a significant impact on epistemic security in democratic 
societies:  
 
1. Develop technological or institutional methods to increase the cost for adversaries 
and blunderers in spreading unsupported, fabricated, or false information. For 
example, penalties could be instituted for the knowing dissemination of false or 
misleading information or fines given to information organizations that do not undertake 
minimum fact-checking procedures. Such penalties do not have to be centralised or 
tangible: censure and condemnation from leaders and respected communities also has 
a role to play. 
 
2. Develop methods of helping information consumers more easily identify 
trustworthy information sources. For example, information organizations and 
platforms could be certified as an epistemically responsible information source. Building 
on Boaz Miller and Isaac Record’s (2013) explication of epistemic responsibility, an 
epistemically responsible information source would be one that has done all that it 
‘practicably can’ to distribute true and well-founded information, where practicability - 
being possible in practice - is constrained by the information provider’s ethical and 
social circumstances and by its technological resources.  
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Explore technological or institutional methods to "signal boost" reliable decision-
relevant information in an asymmetric manner. Signal boosting reliable decision-
relevant information requires engaging head-on with the various societally held views 
on what makes information true and useful, and developing and adapting tools and 
methods that work for, within, and across diverse communities.  
 
To begin, it is possible to draw on existing practices such as scientific replication27, 
journalistic fact-checking28, legal evidential thresholds29, and analytical quality 
assurance30 that are employed by professional communities that have long been 
concerned with issues related to the production and consideration of true information.  
 
Furthermore, in order for democratic authorities to serve the public interest, and in order 
to facilitate widespread collective action in response to crises, it is necessary to elicit 
input from socially and culturally diverse communities as well. In particular, historically 
marginalized groups in a society may have good reason to doubt information offered by 
authorities.31 Therefore, it is important for diverse communities be given a voice when 
considering what constitutes a reliable information source and decision-relevant 
information.  
 
3. Develop technological or institutional methods to monitor changes in the epistemic 
ecosystem and to rapidly detect adversarial epistemic action during times of 
tension or crises. While intervening in epistemic systems is fraught with unintended 
consequences, at the very least strategies should be developed for monitoring 
 
27 Philosophers of science have much to say about the efficacy of result replication as a method of 
verifying scientific results. Inter alia see Collins (1992), Changing order: Replication and Induction in 
Scientific Practice; Giles (2006) The trouble with replication; and Zwaan et. al (2018) Making replication 
mainstream.  
28 “Fact-checking has a traditional meaning in journalism that relates to internal procedures for verifying 
facts prior to publication, as well as a newer sense denoting stories that publicly evaluate the truth of 
statements from politicians, journalists, or other public figures” (Graves & Amazeen 2019). Also see 
Graves (2016). 
29 For example, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in England and Wales lays out a set of general 
principles for prosecuting criminals which includes a threshold test for determining whether sufficient 
grounds of non-speculative evidence have been acquired for lawful prosecution. 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors 
30 For example, the Aqua and Magenta books provide guidance on producing evidence based analysis 
during the design, implementation, delivery and review stages of policy making.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-aqua-book-guidance-on-producing-quality-analysis-for-
government.  
31 For example, historical and continued mistreatment of African Americans in medical trials (e.g. the 
Tuskegee syphilis study and the common exclusion of African Americans from clinical studies) and in 
clinical settings (e.g. the withholdment of pain medication) as well as sustained racial disparities in access 
to healthcare has understandably fostered widespread mistrust among African American’s in medical 
institutions and practitioners (Washington 2006; Scharff 2010). 
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emerging information technologies and platforms, forecasting their impact on informed 
collective action, and monitoring emerging claims and narratives that could undermine 
collective action in times of crises. 
 
However, until such significant technological and institutional advances are made, indeed, even 
once they are made, we must accept that coordinated collective action will be very difficult to 
achieve. Rigorously identifying and assessing potential interventions and threats to a complex 
social epistemic infrastructure is a time consuming and labour intensive process. Therefore, it 
is important to prioritize epistemic security efforts in order to minimize harm from epistemic 
threats. Toward this end we present the following recommendations: 
 
4. Build capacity to engage in holistic systems-mapping procedures (constructing an 
integrated view of social epistemic systems) and red-teaming strategies 
(deliberately exploring a scenario from an adversary's perspective) to help identify 
and analyse epistemic threats. As we describe in the following section, systems-
mapping procedures and red-teaming strategies help to provide more accurate 
overviews of social epistemic infrastructures and their epistemic vulnerabilities and 
strengths and to identify and analyze epistemic threats to society. 
 
Holistic overviews of social epistemic infrastructures are important because complex 
epistemic systems most often suffer from multiple overlapping epistemic threats and 
vulnerabilities such that a solution to one might exacerbate another. Many interventions 
will have second-, third-, and higher-level effects that could be unintentionally 
detrimental to epistemic security. For instance, attempting to discredit information 
spread by an extremist group through public education campaigns may make the 
extremist opinions seem more widely held than they are. The greater visibility of 
extremist perspectives could lend the group greater credibility in the eyes of observers 
limited by time and attention in their capacity to investigate the issue further. This does 
not mean that a public education campaign is an unwise intervention, simply that 
guardians of epistemic security must be careful to consider and prepare for possible 
knock-on effects. 
 
Overall, epistemic threats and vulnerabilities (of technological origin or otherwise) 
should not be addressed as a list of independent problems with prescribed fixes. See 
Table 3.2 in Appendix 3 for further examples. 
 
Finally, holistic system-mapping and red-team strategies also provide useful tools for 
identifying leverage points for effective intervention to mitigate threats and to lessen 
vulnerabilities. These capacities and exercises are particularly relevant when public 
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cooperation is required to achieve beneficial outcomes, e.g. in public health, crime 
prevention and environmental protection. 
 
In section 5 we describe how holistic systems-mapping and red-teaming strategies 
might be implemented using an example from our workshop proceedings (workshop 
scenario 5 - Xenophobic Ethic Cleansing) to illustrate.  
 
  
5. Establish working relationships with a diverse array of experts who are experienced in 
identifying and analysing epistemic threats and who could serve as epistemic security 
advisors before and during crises.  In a crisis it is important that a democratic society 
can deploy people skilled in the kinds of techniques for appraising epistemic threats and 
vulnerabilities described in this paper. Such experts do exist and are currently 
distributed throughout various disciplines and professions (government and non-
government) and employ different strategies for identifying and dealing with epistemic 
threats.  
 
For example, responsible journalists and journalism agencies engage in internal fact 
checking procedures to counter the spread of misinformation, and external fact 
checking organizations within universities and independent research centers engage in 
activities to encourage fact-based public discourse and promote accurate beliefs 
among the public and policy makers (Graves & Amazeen 2019). Psychologists 
investigate vulnerabilities in the processes by which individuals choose to consume 
information and form beliefs (Kahneman 2011, Klayman 1995), information security 
experts are trained in methodologies to prevent unauthorized use, disclosure, or 
alteration to private or sensitive information (von Solms & van Niekerk 2013), and public 
health experts are well familiar with the challenges of coordinating mass collective 
action to address public health crises ranging from disease eradication by vaccination 
to the current COVID-19 pandemic (WHO 2020).   
 
It is important to draw on a diversity of viewpoints when assembling a community of 
epistemic security experts in order to attend to the wide variety of epistemic threats and 
vulnerabilities that face a heterogeneous society.  
 
 
6. Invest in building and curating multidisciplinary epistemic security research groups 
and expert networks. Epistemic security experts are embedded within separate and 
diverse professions and often have limited capacity to respond to (or to help to 
preemptively mitigate) epistemic threats. We recommend establishing dedicated 
45 
programs and institutions to train additional epistemic security experts and to bring 
together a diverse selection of epistemic security experts previously trained in other 
disciplines. As a long term goal, it may also be wise to establish epistemic security as its 
own discipline and for (government) decision-making bodies to employ dedicated 
epistemic security experts. Along these lines, UK Research and Innovation has recently 
issued a call to establish a UK Research Centre of Excellence for Protecting Citizens 
Online with the goal of exploring “holistic approaches to the development of privacy-
enhancing technologies” and building an “interdisciplinary community [that provides] a 
clear single engagement point with enough critical mass to engage with government, 
industry and citizens.”32 Such efforts should be emulated globally. 
5. Systems-mapping and ‘red team’ approaches 
to identifying and assessing epistemic threats 
and vulnerabilities 
In this final section we describe practical techniques to help in identifying threats to a society’s 
capacity for organizing timely and well-informed collective action and for fortifying epistemic 
security. These techniques include systems-mapping methods for the appraisal of epistemic 
vulnerabilities and identification of potential interventions (section 5.1) and red-teaming 
strategies for appraising potential interventions (section 5.2). 
 
Systems-mapping generally describes a process by which the interactions between and within 
social epistemic systems are visually mapped. This is to provide a holistic overview of the 
system’s infrastructures and constituent actors and to help identify epistemic vulnerabilities to 
the system. Systems-mapping can also help identify interventions on a system that might 
bolster the society’s epistemic security.  
 
Red-teaming  broadly refers to the practice of identifying flaws, weaknesses, and failure points 
in a proposal by taking an opposing stance in order to rigorously challenge it. The term is 
derived from a simulated adversarial attack in which a “red team” tries to undermine a “blue 
team” with the intention of helping the blue team identify its weaknesses and failure points. Red 
teaming helps blue teams overcome biased viewpoints and broaden their solutions search.   
 
These techniques build upon one another to help practitioners acquire greater understanding 
of the influences and vulnerabilities in a society's social epistemic infrastructure. Overall, they 
 
32 Research Centre of Excellence in Protecting Citizens Online 
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highlight the value of thinking about threats to epistemic security as systemic challenges, and 
of treating proposed solutions with initial skepticism.  
 
We used systems-mapping methods and red-teaming strategies in our workshops to identify 
and evaluate epistemic vulnerabilites and interventions for six hypothetical scenarios - global 
health crisis, leader character assassination, state fake news, economic collapse, xenophobic 
ethnic cleansing, and epistemic babble - and we found the process to be useful from a state 
regulator’s perspective. We provide running example from scenario 5 (xenophobic ethnic 
cleansing) in the supplementary boxes. Readers can find a full description of all six 
workshopped scenarios in Appendix 2. 
5.1 Systems-mapping for the appraisal of epistemic 
vulnerabilities and interventions 
Epistemic infrastructures can be incredibly complex; they are composed of a wide variety of 
actors with different goals and interests who are organized into complex and technologically-
enabled networks of information processing and exchange. Developing an understanding of a 
society’s epistemic infrastructure is central to identifying epistemic vulnerabilities, 
understanding how different threats and vulnerabilities interact with one another, and for 
mitigating epistemic threats to the system while avoiding negative second-, third- or higher-
order consequences.  
That being said, it is important to acknowledge that given the complexity of social epistemic 
infrastructures it is very challenging, and often impracticable, to fully understand any given 
system and all the relevant internal and external influences thereon. Therefore, the goal of a 
systems-based appraisal is to prioritize epistemic security efforts in order to minimize harms - 
both from epistemic threats and from adverse effects of interventions.33  
We identify several steps that can help build a systems map that provides an understandable 
and useful characterization of a social epistemic system.  
1. Identifying the (potential) crisis 
Identifying a crisis (e.g. terrorist attack) or complex challenge (e.g. epistemic babble) provides a 
tractable starting point for building an understanding of the actors, factors, and interactions 
that may lead up to harmful outcomes. In the workshops we chose to focus on hypothetical 
 
33 A complementary approach is to apply complexity science to the epistemic system, which can highlight 
feedback mechanisms and sources of stability or instability, and propose systemic interventions. See for 
example the application of complexity science to concerns around "democratic backsliding" (Eliassi-Rad 
et al, 2020), which shares many concerns with, and provides a good complement to, the current report. 
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worst-case scenarios to broaden our scope and test the limits of our frameworks for thinking 
about epistemic security. However, we envision practitioners going through this assessment for 
potential crises in their area of responsibility (e.g. assessing epistemic threats that may take 
place during a major cyber-attack) or  during ongoing crises, in which case the focus will be 
determined by the circumstances (e.g. monitoring epistemic security during a pandemic or a 
financial recession). 
2. Identifying relevant stakeholder and actor communities 
Various constituent actors in a social epistemic system may include official decision-making 
bodies, interest groups, public communities, institutions, technology and media platforms, and 
adversaries (or blunderers) with different goals. To keep a systems-based analysis tractable it is 
important to prioritize actors whose decisions hold outsized power with respect to achieving or 
preventing the outcome of concern. For example, it might be especially important to 
understand the epistemic security situation of police workers, health workers, environmental 
protection workers, or financial decision makers, depending on the nature of the crisis or 
dynamic. 
 
3. Identifying community vulnerabilities (and vulnerable communities) 
For the actors and other communities identified as relevant to the scenario under 
consideration, it is useful to analyse the different vulnerabilities of those communities, e.g. in 
terms of attention scarcity, fragility of trust, community motivated reasoning, cognitive bias, 
susceptibility to adversarial (or blunderer) interference, or other vulnerabilities. For example, 
children, working adults, and seniors might be differently vulnerable to misinformation and 
disinformation, due to different levels of  media literacy, attention scarcity, misplaced trust or 
poor heuristics for establishing trust. Also, communities that have been historically mistreated 
or marginalized by authoritative decision-makers may have good reason to be distrustful of the 
information and decisions passed on by those authorities.34 
 
 
4. Evaluating how technologies can be used to either perpetuate or diminish 
epistemic vulnerabilities 
Within each community various technologies can exacerbate threats to epistemic security or 
enable (or hinder) activities that may bolster epistemic security and the organization of 
collective action. To help identify these technologies and the potential epistemic threats they 
pose, relevant questions to consider include: 
 
 
34 See footnote 30. 
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● What technologies are central to the society’s systems of information dissemination and 
exchange? 
● What media sources are available and how are they consumed by different 
communities?  
● What search or filtering mechanisms exist and how are they used or misused?  
● What role do algorithmic recommendations play in shaping information flows and 
network connections?  
● Who has control over the shape and behaviour of communications networks?  Who in 
the group has the ability and/or responsibility to contribute new information, moderate 
content, or control group membership? How are they technologically enabled? 
● How might adversaries gain access to communication networks, and what could they 
do with the information?  
● What technologies perpetuate the dissemination of reliable information? 
● Are there technologies that can be used to minimize the influence of adversarial actors 
or blunderers? 
 
Appendix 3 provides an initial list of epistemic threats posed by specific emerging technologies, 
and some proposed solutions for each, which may be used as a tool to help in identifying and 
assessing technology-based epistemic risks and vulnerabilities. 
 
5. Mapping the socio-technological epistemic system 
Visually mapping out the interaction within a technologically-enabled social epistemic system 
provides a useful tool for identifying further epistemic threats and vulnerabilities and for 
identifying points for effective intervention on the system. We suggest using a causal map to 
visualize the flow of authoritative and malign content in relevant epistemic networks. When 
building the map, it helps to keep the following factors in mind: 
 
● Information sources: How does information get into the system (see knowledge 
sources (section 3.1) for inspiration). If the information source is testimonial, do you 
know anything about the source’s interests, goals, or other characteristics that might 
influence their behaviour? 
● Information distribution: How is information spread or amplified, and who has control 
over or might otherwise influence the spread of information? 
● Attenuation and evolution of content: Do messages retain their content as they 
spread? How might informational content be lost, changed, or manipulated over time?   
● Counter-messaging: Do any of the constituent actors engage in efforts to spread 
‘alternative-narratives’ to counter the messages being spread by another group? For 
example, a human rights organization might flood social media platforms with stories 
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about atrocities being committed against refugees to counter the messages being 
perpetuated by a xenophobic extremist group. 
● Character and behaviour of information recipients: Do information recipients ever 
become information sources or amplifiers? Do they change their beliefs and actions 
based on the information they receive? Are information recipients likely to trust 
information distributed by authorities? What factors might be underpinning or 
undermining this trust? 
● Technological influence: How are different technologies used to amplify, undermine, or 
otherwise influence these factors? 
 
Boxes 5.1a and 5.1b provide an example from workshop scenario 5. See Appendix 2 for 
additional examples.35 
 
Box 5.1 a 
Systems-mapping scenario 5 - xenophobic ethnic cleansing 
 
To recap, scenario 5 describes a society in which a radical xenophobic group wishes to turn a 
country’s population against a minority refugee community. First, the radical group launches 
its campaign with a low-grade chemical attack on a school and second, they use video 
alterering technologies and targeted social media blasts to pin blame on the minority 
community and to rally public animosity towards the refugees. Note the second phase of the 
radical group’s plan constitutes an adversarial attack against the society's epistemic 
infrastructure; the group widely distributes false information with the intention of 
manipulating public and policy-maker opinion and behavior toward the refugees.  
 
We began by identifying the harm that the adversarial actor wished to achieve (public 
animosity towards refugees). Doing so leads naturally to listing the most relevant actors for 
appraisal and then mapping out their interactions (technologically-enabled or otherwise) 




● Radical xenophobic group 
 
35 This simple causal map provides only an initial sketch of the relevant system. For a more in-depth 
analysis, it is possible to go further and develop a hierarchical causal map, for example by focusing, 
initially, on the actions of the malicious actors.  Such hierarchical causal maps can provide a richer picture 
of how specific actions give rise to the harm and of how actions by different actors interact. 
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● The public, whose opinions, decisions, and actions the radical group aims to 
influence 
● Public authorities 
 
Other Communities/Groups/Audiences 
● Minority refugee community - not identified as an actor as it is not the direct target 
of the radical groups adversarial effort. 
      
A more complete analysis of such a scenario might result in the addition of the minority 
refugee community as an actor. Similarly it might break down one or more of the above actors 
into a more granular set of actors. The workshop scenario analysis was bounded by time and 
effort and so we prioritized the three actors above as key. 
 




Threat system - the radical xenophobic group 
Target population system - the public, whose opinions, decisions, and actions the radical 
group aims to influence 
Public Authorities system - policy-makers, government officials, and groups enabled by the 
officials (e.g. police force, military, health workers etc.) to counteract the radical group’s 
efforts and to prevent further adversarial attack. If the radical group is successful public 






Once the epistemic systems and vulnerabilities implicated in a crisis or dynamic have been 
mapped, it is possible to identify and begin evaluating interventions that can bolster epistemic 
security and mitigate threats. A more comprehensive causal map will depict a greater number 
of potential intervention points and will make it easier to evaluate which intervention points will 
likely yield the most effective interventions. 
 
However, it is not necessary to hold off on intervention identification until systems-mapping is 
‘complete’. Contemplating different interventions brings to light new ways in which different 
actors interact and influence one another. Map building is an iterative process that benefits 










Box 5.1 b 
Adding potential interventions. 
 
Here we add potential interventions to the system map sketched in section 3.1.4 . Note that 
when compared with the original map, a number of enhancements can be seen, for example 
the addition of a set of blue boxes in the bottom right. The main change has been the 
identification of a larger number of possible interventions. A comparison with the original 
scenario system map will highlight that a number of items in the original map have been re-




The interventions in yellow have not yet been appraised for their feasibility (including ethical, 






When assessing potential interventions, it is crucial to consider the impacts of the interventions 
and to assess the various ways in which an intervention could backfire. Epistemic interventions 
often exist in a delicate balance of tradeoffs (e.g. between freedom of speech and prevention of 
harm). Therefore they may easily exacerbate epistemic vulnerabilities (e.g. erosion of trust in 
state-provided information) if not well-vetted. We recommend coupling the systems-based 
mapping presented in sections 5.1 with “red team” strategies for testing the feasibility, efficacy, 
robustness, and potential unintended consequences of different interventions. Recall, red-
teaming broadly refers to the practice of identifying flaws, weaknesses, and failure points in a 
proposed intervention to an epistemic system by taking an opposing stance in order to 
rigorously challenge it.   
 
A well-functioning red team will be a diverse group of individuals composed of a variety of 
stakeholders and of experts from a range of relevant disciplines. It is a standard tenet of social 
epistemology that diverse viewpoints in a decision-making group encourage careful 
deliberation (Holst & Molander 2017; Sunstein & Hastie 2015) and that the examination of 
critiques and dissenting opinions yields more well-considered judgments (Longino 2002). In 
particular, diverse representation of stakeholders on red teams ensures that the values and 
interests that motivate different actors are accounted for in the assessment. Understanding the 
values motivating red team and blue team actors, and understanding the coherence of values 
within those teams, will provide significant insight into each group’s capacity for timely 
collective action.  
 
Furthermore, incorporating diverse stakeholder viewpoints ensures that the interests of 
communities most likely to be affected are not overlooked in the assessment. For instance, if an 
epistemic security-defending entity, or ‘blue team’ (government or otherwise), is developing 
strategies to mitigate epistemic threats posed to social media users by online echo chambers, 
social media users should be involved in ‘red-teaming’ the authority’s proposed strategies to 
look for flaws or unintended adverse consequences.36 Similarly, if a minority group is being 
villainized by adversarial actors, members of the minority group ought to be included on the 
task force to address the threat. 
 
 
36 We attempted to follow this advice in our workshops, drawing on expertise from academics across a 
range of fields (media studies, psychology, technology risk assessment), from security experts and 
engineers in corporates, NGOs and government labs, from national and international defence 
communities, and from technology regulators. However, we acknowledge that even this mix can and 
should be greatly expanded, especially when dealing with ongoing or imminent crises. 
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In this section we describe three red-teaming strategies - Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) charts, pre-mortems, and futures wheels - which we found 
useful for evaluating potential interventions to aid in maintaining or restoring epistemic security 
in a society. We used these techniques because (i) the SWOT forces consideration of an 
intervention from the perspective of a particular actor, (ii) pre-mortem forces consideration of 
intervention failure, and (iii) the futures wheel forces consideration of potential 2nd and 3rd 
order intervention effects. The different techniques support the ‘red team’ in taking a number of 
different views and provide a lightweight structure (or handrail) to the ‘red team’ analysis. 
 
Box 5.2 provides an example of each red-teaming strategy with respect to a single intervention 
proposed for scenario 5 - implementing a public education campaign to delegitimize the 
rhetoric of far right extremist groups. Each proposed intervention or different combination of 
interventions should undergo its own red team evaluation. If multiple interventions are 
identified that are likely to be robust and effective, red-teaming strategies should be employed 
to evaluate the interventions when used in concert; it is possible that additional consequences 
emerge from the simultaneous employment of multiple interventions.  
 
SWOT 
When considering the impacts of interventions, it is important to recognise that the intervening 
actor (e.g. the state or blue team) is not the only actor operating in/on the system; Internal 
system dynamics, blunderers, or a creative adversary might act to foil, re-direct or co-opt the 
intervention. The SWOT technique helps to evaluate how well different actors are equipped to 
respond to (or to initiate) an intervention. 
 
Filling out a SWOT helps to identify the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats that 
pertain to specific actors (e.g red teams and blue teams) and to evaluate the likely efficacy of a 
potential intervention given those factors. Strengths and weaknesses are internal factors or 
actor characteristics that will help or hinder the actor in achieving its objectives. These may 
include team composition, past experience, or access to physical, financial, or technological 
resources. On the other hand, opportunities and threats are external influencing factors such as 
economic trends, cultural change, new legislation, the adoption of a certain technology by 





Generally speaking, the more an actor enjoys alignment of strengths and opportunity, the better 
equipped it is to make more aggressive or risky moves. For instance, an adversary that enjoys 
alignment of strengths and opportunity will be more robust to intervention and more likely to 
make more aggressive attacks. Similarly, blue teams that enjoy greater strengths and 
opportunities are more well-equipped to take offensive action against adversarial influence. 
Inversely, blue teams plagued with a greater proportion of weaknesses and threats may be wise 
to act more defensively or to implement more defensive interventions. 
 
Pre-mortem 
The pre-mortem red-teaming technique starts by assuming that an intervention has failed and 
then works backwards to construct causal pathways that could lead to such a failure. With the 
possible pathways to failure sketched out, various modifications to the intervention structure or 
enforcement are proposed to prevent the same failure when the intervention is actually rolled 
out. Conducting a pre-mortem may illustrate that a particular intervention has too many 





The futures wheel red-teaming technique is the inverse of a pre-mortem. It starts with a 
potential intervention and works outwards to identify possible first-, second- and higher-order 
consequences of an intervention. First the initial consequences of an intervention (first-order 
impacts) are traced out. Both probable impacts and low-probability/high-impact consequences 
are included and identified as positive (green), negative (red), or neutral or uncertain (yellow) 
outcomes. Then, by considering the first-order impacts as interventions in and of themselves, a 
second level of consequences are added (thus mapping out second-order impacts). This 
process can continue for third- and higher-order impacts as long as new consequences are 
identified that are considered robust or particularly important (e.g. because they could lead to 
unacceptable risk). Once multiple orders of potential intervention consequences are identified, 
it is easier to pick out interventions that are more likely to yield positive and neutral outcomes. 






Red-teaming scenario 5 - xenophobic ethnic cleansing - Education Campaign 
 
SWOT - evaluating actor strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats  
 
In the workshop we applied the SWOT analysis to the interventions ‘work with platforms 
providers to delay/remove Red messaging’ and ‘Use tech tools to disrupt Red messaging’ . 
Both interventions were concerned with Red messaging and concerned a third party.  
 
We filled out SWOT charts for relevant actors: the guardians of epistemic security (the blue 
team), and the xenophobic extremist group (the red team). 
 










Red Team - Xenophobic radical group 
 
 
The Blue SWOT shows a concern for speed of response and a consistency of action which is 
balanced; whilst the Red SWOT shows strengths and opportunities around agility and speed 




Premortem - describing how an intervention might fail 
 
In the workshop we quickly applied the pre-mortem approach across the set of interventions 
to identify what might be the outcome of a failure. Time prevented creating a causal map for 
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these failures; but it served the important function of getting the group comfortable with 
expressing why an intervention might fail and thus looking for potential weaknesses in the 
ideas. 
 
There were 3 interventions related to ‘delegitimising the far-right group’ so we grouped them 
together as below. 
 
Interventions: 
● Delegitimise far right groups through education 
● Work with young people to delegitimise 
● ‘Other’ the Reds 
 
Failures: 
● Attempt to delegitimise far right backfires, delegitimising the government and 
bringing about the election of a far right government. 
● ‘Young people’ may not be the primary target audience of Red.  Likely to reach older, 
disadvantaged segments of the population.   
● ‘Othering’ generates sympathy for right wing – Tommy Robinson 2.0. 
 
The pre-mortem identified a set of potential failures; further analysis of the causes can 
identify risks associated with the intervention. These risks can then be analysed and, where 
feasible, mitigation plans developed. 
 
 
Futures Wheel - mapping intervention consequences 
 
We started with the intervention (delegitimize far right groups through education) and 




The futures wheel identifies potential negative (red) consequences. It may be possible that 
there is no reasonable modification, and the negative consequence has to be acknowledged 
as a possible risk. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
Maintaining a society’s epistemic security is a multifaceted challenge. Well-informed and timely 
group decision-making requires knowledge drawn from a variety of sources, including 
experience, memory, reason, and most of all, a diverse assortment of testimony. Our social 
epistemic infrastructure - the collection of systems, processes, and actors that influence how 
knowledge is produced, distributed, acquired, and modified within a society - are susceptible to 
a variety of threats and vulnerabilities. These include attention scarcity, conflicting community 
values, the fragility of trust, and adversarial action. Technologies embedded in our social 
epistemic infrastructures are intentionally and accidentally used to both pacify and exacerbate 
threats to epistemic security, but we identify a trend whereby recent technological advances 
have led to a net increase in costs for establishing informed collective action.  
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This report presents insights drawn from a series of workshops conducted to explore 
challenges to collective knowledge acquisition and knowledge-based decision-making. We 
explain that because many narrowly targeted fixes to current epistemic threats often risk 
detrimental second-, third-, and higher order consequences, epistemic threats should not be 
viewed as a laundry list of challenges accompanied by a list of prescribed fixes. Rather, more 
holistic approaches to identifying and analyzing threats to epistemic security, such as "red 
team" and "systems-mapping" approaches that employ diverse teams of experts and interest 
group representatives, are necessary to accurately characterise a social epistemic 
infrastructure and its epistemic vulnerabilities and strengths. We suggest that such holistic 
appraisals, coupled with long-term investment in technological and institutional solutions, are 
likely to present effective strategies for evaluating and mitigating threats to a democracy’s 
epistemic security. This security is critical to a society's ability to organize collective action on 
the basis of timely and reliable information in a technologically advanced world.  
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Appendix 1: Workshop Process & Logistics 
 
In order to investigate challenges to epistemic security we ran a series of three one-day 
collaborative workshops. Our aim was to enhance our understanding of how emerging 
technologies both undermine and buttress collective decision making processes and to begin 
to identify mitigation strategies.  
● Workshop 1 focused on creating a set of six threat scenarios and developing an initial 
view of the interacting systems within each scenario. 
● Workshop 2  focused on identifying possible interventions for each scenario with the 
potential to mitigate threats to collective decision-making and enhance epistemic 
security. 
● Workshop 3 focused on using a variety of methods to analyse a subset of intervention 
options for each scenario for their potential efficacy, robustness, and potential 2nd and 
3rd order effects. 
  
The workshops were co-sponsored by the Alan Turing Institute37, the Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory (Dstl)38 and the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk39, and facilitated 
by a team provided by Dstl. The attendees included representatives from government agencies, 
non-governmental organisations, academia, and industry.  
Workshop 1: Creating scenario based system models 
The key purpose of the first workshop was to set the condition for success at the second 
workshop by providing a handrail to support the development of a rich set of mitigation 
strategies. This was achieved by creating six threat scenarios and developing a view of the 
interacting systems associated with each threat scenario and the wider environment within 
which they sit. These six scenarios were not meant to be exhaustive of all the possible ways in 
which epistemic security could fail due to potential future socio-technical information 
environments and systems. Rather, they served to illustrate a range of qualitatively different 
failure modes that the workshop attendees considered both plausible and impactful. 
  
Each scenario was represented as a causal map of important and interacting elements 
influencing the production and exchange of information. In terms of methodology this 






system's constituent parts interrelate, as well as how systems work over time and within the 
context of larger systems. The approach is particularly useful for systems that have evolved in 
an unplanned fashion (i.e. not ‘designed’) such as the socio-technical systems associated with 
epistemic security. 
  
A useful definition of a system from a systems thinking perspective is "an  open  set  of  
complementary  interacting  parts,  with  properties,  capabilities  and behaviours  emerging,  
both  from  the  parts  and  their  interactions,  to  synthesise  a  unified  whole" (Hitchins, 2008). 
 
Many socio-technical systems are complex, unbounded, dynamic and open. So the concept of a 
system is used within ‘systems thinking’ not simply to model situations, but to provide a method 
of framing and organising information about those situations; thus at the first workshop we 
applied the concept of a system to a situation in order to gain insight and understanding into 
the capabilities required by or enabling the various actors in the scenario. 
  
We framed the discussion of the socio-technical systems associated with each crisis scenario 
by prompting attendees to develop a visual representation of what the Red (i.e Adversary, or 
Threat) system was doing (and needed in order to achieve its objectives); the Green or Target 
system (i.e. system whose epistemic security was under threat); and the Blue or Defending 
system (i.e. system attempting to mitigate the effect of disinformation). An example of the 





The resulting scenario systems map provides a rich picture of the interacting systems, and 
provides a handrail to support identification of possible interventions. In addition, the Dstl team 
captured a short narrative description of each scenario workshop in order to provide context to 
the scenario systems map. 
 
The practicality of running a workshop with a diverse set of people, many of whom had only met 
each other for the first time at the workshop, meant that: 
● The initial part of the first workshop was devoted to ensuring the group had a common 
understanding of the purpose and method. 
● Attendees were divided into groups of around 10 for syndicate sessions. Each syndicate 
was supported by a facilitator and a scribe provided by Dstl.   
● Three syndicates operated in parallel, and each attendee worked on the concept map 
for two of the scenarios. 
Additionally we changed the membership of the syndicates between sessions to maximise the 
number of interactions between the attendees and to counteract ‘groupthink’ within 
syndicates. 
 
After the workshop, the concept maps and narrative descriptions were circulated to attendees. 
Workshop 2: Identifying potential interventions 
The purpose of the second workshop was to build on the outputs of the first workshop by 
identifying intervention points within the set of interacting systems associated with a particular 
scenario and by identifying and grouping the interventions which might be useful at these 
points to mitigate the threats. 
 
The workshop started with a reminder of the scenarios. As at the first workshop, three 
syndicate sessions were run in parallel with each syndicate addressing one scenario. The 
syndicates each had about 10 attendees and was supported by a Dstl facilitator. Again, each 
attendee addressed two of the scenarios, and syndicate membership was altered between 
sessions. Finally there was a general brief back and discussion session. 
 
Whilst the primary purpose within the syndicate sessions was to identify and discuss potential 
interventions, the attendees were also encouraged to review and enhance the concept maps by 
considering in turn the red, blue, and green systems. The facilitators used a set of key questions to 
encourage and focus the discussions. For example, when considering the red system the 
following questions were used: 
● What else do the red systems need, do, create, have, etc.? 
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● Are any red system elements under-represented? 
● What does the red system depend on? 
● Can you make things any worse?  
 
An example of the resulting scenario systems map with suggested (but not yet assessed) 
interventions is presented below. The interventions are marked in yellow. When compared with 
the original map, a number of enhancements can be seen, for example the addition of a set of 
blue boxes on the top right. The main change has been the identification of a larger number of 
possible interventions. Again a comparison with the original scenario system map will highlight 
that a number of items in the original map have been re-coded as interventions in this revised 
version. 
 
   
 
It is important to note that the interventions were not reviewed for their acceptability (ethical, 
legal or social) at this stage; clearly a formal review of the acceptability, and effectiveness, of 
any potential intervention would need to be undertaken implemented. 
74 
Workshop 3: ‘Red-teaming’ the interventions 
The purpose of the third workshop was to build on the outputs of the previous  workshops by 
‘red-teaming’ the interventions identified at the second workshop in order to examine their 
utility and anticipated outcomes, including the possibility of unintended consequences. 
 
Three particular analytic techniques were used to examine the interventions: 
● Pre-Mortem; 
● Futures Wheel; 
● SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats). 
 
The Pre-Mortem technique focuses attention on how plans to enact an outcome may fail, and 
thus overcome any optimism bias within the plan and lead to the development of a more robust 
plan. In outline, the participants start by describing what a fiasco (as opposed to the intended 
outcome) might look like, then identify what caused the plan to fail and the fiasco to occur, 
before developing a set of actions to address the main concerns identified. 
 
The Futures Wheel technique focuses attention on potential first-, second- and third-order 
consequences of an action: in this case of a particular intervention.  These consequences are 




The SWOT technique focuses attention again on a particular intervention, but instead looks at 
the intervention from the perspective of a particular actor (e.g. Blue or Red) to identify 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) associated with the intervention 





As in the previous workshops, the participants were divided into syndicates. The syndicates 
were facilitated by Dstl. Three syndicates ran in parallel, and each attendee addressed two 
scenarios. 
 
The third workshop only had sufficient time to address a very small subset of the potential 
interventions identified in the second workshop. This illustrates that the most time-consuming 
part of developing an approach to mitigate risks to epistemic security is likely to be assessing 
potential interventions and developing a robust action plan to address the risks. 
Appendix 2: Workshop Scenarios  
 
This appendix includes the scenario narratives and system maps, including the interventions, 
developed during the workshops. The scenario system maps are the output from the second 
workshop. 
 
The six scenarios are: 
1. Global Health Crisis. During a major event, a pandemic in this case, a range of actors 
exploit the opportunity to spread misinformation and disinformation for their own 
reasons. This leads to dangerous practices, deaths and a significantly increased burden 
on health services. 
2. Character Assassination for Profit. Identification of individuals who may be influential 
in the future, and the creation of long-term fake histories so there is ready-made 
material for blackmailing, discrediting, or otherwise manipulating these people in a way 
that is difficult to disprove. 
3. State Fake News. The government of a nation state feels challenged by a set of 
developments and wishes to create a fake narrative to deny its responsibility or the need 
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to act.  The narrative refers specifically to climate change, but it could apply to other 
issues such as historic events. 
4. Economic System Collapse. The financial system rests upon trust. Trust is undermined 
by use of disinformation to manipulate trades, the use of AI-driven high frequency 
trading, and an increased reliance on crypto-currencies. 
5. Xenophobic Ethnic Cleansing. A radical xenophobic group organises an attack and 
blames it on a minority in order to create a major societal backlash against the minority 
group. 
6. Epistemic Babble. Individuals turn to information mediating technologies to help cope 
with an increasing deluge of claims, counter-claims, and attention-grabbing 
presentations. Information overload leads people to attend primarily to information that 
aligns with their pre-held beliefs. The ability of individuals to attend critically to complex 
arguments atrophies, and achieving a broad consensus for action on complicated 
issues becomes more difficult.  
 
The narratives provide context to the scenario system maps. They are not predictions of a 
particularly likely future. Instead they represent important features of a potential future 
situation and provide a framework for the analysis of systems and interventions. 
Scenario 1: Global Health Crisis 
Narrative: In this scenario a health crisis sweeps across the world. Its source is unknown. 
 
Official national organisations seek to reassure their populations, provide informed advice and 
guidance to keep their populations safe, and take some action to address the crisis. 
 
The populations want to know how to stay safe, but don’t know what to do. They seek guidance 
tailored to their situation, but are not quite sure what to believe. The slow appearance of official 
information drives them to seek any plausible advice. The advice is repeatedly disseminated 
between friends. This results in many people following dangerous practices, which increases 
the burden on health services. There is a rise in suicides throughout populations. There is also a 
rise in alternative institutions. Populations want access to drugs to protect themselves, and are 
willing to pay. 
 
There are also groups operating with malicious intent, seeking to prolong and extend the crisis 
for their own objectives. These groups may have started the crisis, but nobody knows. Their 
motivations could vary from exploiting the situation for their financial benefit, to furthering 
grudges or political aims, to simply wanting to cause trouble. 
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Everyone may be affected by the health crisis: populations at large, those who may be 
functioning as officials, and those with malicious intent. 
The result of the health crisis is the destabilisation of populations who don’t know what to do, 
who have little faith in the ability of their official organisations to improve the situation, and who 
just see things getting worse. Those who think they are causing the crisis exploit the situation 
and enjoy the spectacle. 
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Global Health Crisis scenario systems map 
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Global Health Crisis interventions and red-teaming 
The systems map, interventions and red-teaming all highlighted the importance of preparation 
and trust in countering malicious actors and messages during a crisis. This included actions 
such as: 
● Development and testing of plans to provide the public with access to information 
taking account of the presence of malicious actors and the complexity of social 
epistemic systems. 
● Creation and maintenance of trusted information channels before the crisis (noting that 
these may be both digital and non-digital). The Pre-Mortem and SWOT both highlighted 
the risks associated with compromise of the channels and the unintentional provision of 
incorrect information. The SWOT also highlighted a Blue weakness stemming from the 
potential complexity and uncertainty of an emergent health crisis, with corresponding 
opportunities for Red. 
 
Scenario 2: Character Assassination for Profit 
Narrative. In this scenario, rather than trying to implant ‘fake news’ into current world events, a  
long term view is taken in which a group of ‘potential future leaders’ is identified and a whole 
‘fake history’ is created for each individual as they progress their careers. 
  
The plan is that once these individuals become influential, some of the fake embedded facts 
about their early lives can be used to manipulate their actions either overtly or subliminally. As 
these facts will be verifiably contemporary with the events they purport to record, proving that 
they are false will be virtually impossible, making the damage they do much more effective.  
 
Clearly many of the false histories created will never be of use, but the few that can be used will 
be sufficiently effective to justify the effort. 
 
This influence could be achieved in a number of ways: 
● Traditional blackmail either for money, as a way of financing terrorist acts, or to make 
them behave in a way that they would not otherwise have done (voting for example); 
● Simply distracting their attention at a crisis point either political or economic so that 
chaos ensues; 
● Releasing, what would by then be, authenticatable historic information in order to 
undermine their credibility and force a resignation or other desired outcome. 
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There are two possible motivations for this, both of which would need initial access to finance 
and a long term commitment: 
1. A politically motivated group which sees this as part of a long term strategy to 
undermine its enemies or to gain financing for terrorist activities. 
2. A long term investment for profit in which someone with no particular political agenda 
simply amasses information to sell at the appropriate time and to anyone who will pay, 
as they would be able to sell their ‘information’ to a variety of different interest groups. 
This could increase the success rate for the ‘fake histories’ and therefore the potential 
for profit. 
 
In either case this is enabled by the availability of cheap data storage and the technology to 
allow photographs and documents to be believably tampered with. 
 
The ability and foresight to create fake documents at the appropriate time (e.g. a picture of 
someone dealing drugs created and stored when they were 20 and held for use in 20 or 30 
years’ time) adds to the authenticity of the spurious information as does the creation of a 
holistic story involving multiple event and associates. 
 
This opens up a variety of opportunities which could enable the subversion of the political 








Character Assassination for Profit interventions and red-teaming 
The Pre-Mortem highlighted the potential risk that we end up in a world in which trust in digital 
experience and testimony is effectively zero, and thus it becomes impossible to hold individuals 
to account and society is potentially overwhelmed by scepticism and cynicism. It is worth 
noting that this future world is similar to the Epistemic Babble scenario and is very similar to the 
“Death of Reality” future scenario in The Emerging Risk of Virtual Societal Warfare by M Mazarr 
et al (2019).   
 
There are clusters of interventions relating to: 
1. Changing societal culture associated with historic taboos, a rush-to-judgement, levels of 
proof and awareness of potential threat 
2. Fact-checking 
3. Life logs 
4. Attribution of deep fakes and fake histories, including: 
a. Encouraging/regulating for digital rights management approaches which ensure 
tools include ‘watermarks’ (e.g. using steganography); 
b. Developing tools to detect ‘fakes’ (so raising the cost of creating fakes). 
 
The SWOT analysis of the intervention “regulate access channels” (near top left of the map) 
identified that, from the Blue perspective, this would be difficult to achieve and, from the Red 
perspective, relatively easy to subvert (unless there was significant international agreement and 
cooperation).  
 
The Futures Wheel analysis of the intervention “regulate faking tools as if firearms” created a 
rich picture of 2nd and 3rd order effects and potential interactions. It is included below as an 
example of the richness of the analysis that use of such a method can promote; but it should be 




Scenario 3: State Fake News 
Narrative: The government of a nation state feels challenged by a set of developments and 
wishes to create a fake narrative to deny its responsibility or the need to act. The narrative 
below refers specifically to climate change; but it could apply to other issues such as historic 
events. (It is noticeable that the scenario systems map which was created is not specific to the 
example of climate change.) 
In this scenario, the leader of the government in State X is determined to maintain the high 
global reputation of their state with respect to its culpability for global warming.  The State 
needs to avoid reparation costs. The State also needs to maintain global markets. 
The official organisations of State X design an influence narrative. They assess the skills and 
technologies needed to ‘re-write history’. One of their first actions is to create a fake 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) video showing officials denying the 
occurrence of global warming. They identify the appropriate channels for communicating fake 
news, disseminate a continuing stream and suppress any opposing views. 
The populations in other nations hearing the news will access that news via many sources. 
They trust the news from their favourite sources, and accept the narrative initiated by State X.  
However, populations still see that sea levels are rising and choose to move away from littoral 
zones. This results in the mass migration of populations inland and to other states. 
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Official organisations in other nations recognise they are being disadvantaged by the emerging 
narrative. The nations experiencing mass immigration struggle to adapt at the pace needed, 
and experience a degree of unrest. Official organisations seek to counter the false narratives by 
detecting them and disseminating corrected information through the same news channels. 
Through regulation, these official organisations seek to highlight and limit the activities of fake 
news perpetrators. 
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State Fake News scenario systems map 
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State Fake News interventions and red-teaming 
The systems map highlights the central role played, in this scenario, by (1) trusted sources of 
testimonial knowledge, (2) the ability to understand, build and micro-target audiences, (3) the 
ability to understand the objectives, methods and effect of Red narratives, and (4) access to 
channels used by audiences (& audiences’ access to channels). 
 
The red-teaming highlighted the following issues and challenges: 
● There is the potential for Blue to win the ‘battle’ but lose the ‘war’ if not clear on long 
term objectives (aka moral reflection on Blue position with respect to ‘truth’); 
● Accountability and reach of broadcast channels, and role of dialogue channels versus 
broadcast channels; 
● Blue and audience access to channels. 
Scenario 4: Economic System Collapse 
Narrative: In this scenario, the creation of narrow AI code by the financial industry for short-
term gain, coupled with a reliance on crypto-currencies, leads to economic collapse.  
The highly competitive culture within the financial industry and its focus on short-term gain 
leads the industry to create narrow AI code, lacking proper validation and verification, which 
makes short-term gain decisions. Financial professionals, driven by profit, encourage the short-
term gain culture. They also begin to advise investors to rely on crypto-currencies. Criminals 
and other bad actors devise new ways to leech profit for themselves from this development.   
The expectation that commodity has value underpins the international financial system, so 
dependence on crypto-currencies, which are not linked to any tangible asset nor supported by 
any national government, threatens that system. 
International regulation by the financial authorities, designed to keep a financial system based 
on commodities with value stable, fails to adapt sufficiently fast to the new models of financial 
dealing driven by the use of crypto-currency. Before the authorities can enact international 
controls on these new models, investors suddenly lose faith in a specific crypto-currency when 
its technical underpinning is compromised. They attempt to realise the capital it represented in 
large numbers. The crypto-currency cannot deliver and this leads to the disintegration of other 
financial models linked to it. As investors have traded real commodities using crypto-currency, 
this undermines the currency of countries which invested real money in the production of those 
commodities. Traditional financial models therefore also begin to break down, leading to a 
failure of most parts of the financial system and economic collapse. 
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Economic System Collapse scenario system maps 
 
88 
Economic System Collapse interventions and red-teaming 
The potential interventions identified were very wide ranging - though the Pre-Mortem 
suggested at least one was probably effectively impossible (returning to the Gold Standard).  
They included: 
● Changing the objectives and behaviours of the financial system; 
● Enhanced training, inc. ethics, for quants and developers; 
● Enhanced testing of algorithmic tools used within the financial system 
● Methods to mitigate the impact of algorithmic based trading (including both pre-event, 
during an event and post-event); 
● Methods and tools to understand the behaviour of the system-of-systems (including in 
response to invalid information).  
 
The Pre-Mortem highlighted the problem that at least some actors within the system will push 
the boundaries and/or cheat due to a perception that this will allow them to ‘win’. 
 
The SWOT focused on the testing of algorithms in a sand-pit environment.  It highlighted 
challenges associated with implementing a testing regime that is both effective and efficient, 
and which can not be ‘gamed’.  However, it also identified that it offered potential opportunities 
for development and testing of new theories and products, and for leadership in development of 
norms. 
Scenario 5: Xenophobic Ethnic Cleansing 
Narrative: In this scenario a far right xenophobic faction forces the departure of a specific 
ethnic community. 
The faction’s controlling group decides on a strategy of implicating the ethnic community in a 
chemical or biological attack, which will turn public opinion against that community so much 
that extreme violence against them will be considered justifiable by elements of the population.  
Thus, these elements are the ‘target population’ of the far right faction.  
The controlling group uses facilitators to access chemical/biological weapon skills, the actual 
materials required for an attack, and technical skills in AI. Before they stage the 
chemical/biological attack, the group uses AI to research the vulnerabilities of their target 
group, gain as much knowledge of its intended victim ethnic community as possible, and 
researches and then selects the most effective and damaging course of action (CoA) possible 
for the chemical/biological attack.  
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The far right faction perpetrates the chemical/biological attack. Its controlling group then uses 
AI to push messages at speed and scale to the target population (through the channels that 
population uses to receive news and communicate) claiming that the specific ethnic 
community is responsible for this attack.  
Elements of the target population then mobilise, arm themselves and use violence to drive out 
the ethnic community. The far right faction has achieved its objective.  
To combat this situation, the blue team authorities have the ability to detect, verify, attribute, 
and stop the activities perpetrated by the far right faction. They must be able to create and push 
a credible counter-message at speed and scale to the target population and ultimately, they 
must be able to halt the violence against the ethnic community.   
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Xenophobic Ethnic Cleansing scenario systems map 
 
91 
Xenophobic Ethnic Cleansing interventions and red-teaming 
Many of the interventions identified are traditional counter terrorism and de-radicalisation 
techniques. The interventions which are less traditional, as they relate to this specific scenario, 
are those related to (a) countering deep fakes and (b) adding delay into the communication 
channels (in order to slow mobilisation and “mob” behaviour).  
 
The Futures Wheels provided a rapid way of beginning to analyse the complexities and 
potential down-sides associated with interventions. The Futures Wheels for the two 
interventions which use education to enhance target resilience to (a) far right messages and (b) 
deep fakes are included below. 
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Scenario 6: Epistemic Babble 
Narrative: In this scenario the ability for the general population to tell the difference between 
truth and fiction (presented as truth) is lost. 
Social media has allowed people to put forward spurious views and for them to be accepted 
along with the views of true experts as being of equal value. This in turn has led to expertise 
being devalued and people no longer respecting or accepting the views of educated and 
knowledgeable people, or accepting authority in any way. 
Although information is easily available, people routinely purport to be other than themselves 
on electronic media and this goes undetected, so people cannot tell whether the information 
they are receiving is reliable or not. 
People connect with others but have little idea of who that person really is or where they come 
from. ‘Social’ interaction is less ‘social’ and more computer-based. These developments have 
resulted in societies both mixing more and fracturing, with contradictory views being strongly 
held by different factions within a society. 
Additionally the education system relies on digital technologies to radically reduce the number 
of real teachers (without adequate testing of the change). This results in pupils not developing 
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the ability to apply critical thinking to the information that is presented to them, as so much is, 
and has been presented, without the guidance of an adult. 
The result of this ‘Epistemic Babble’ is that there is an environment of ‘knowledge’ and belief 
that could be easily manipulated, and hence the views and actions of society are ‘up for grabs’. 
The question is who will ‘grab’ them? 
 
Note:  This scenario lacks the malicious actors present in the other scenarios.  There are strong 
resonances between this scenario and the “Death of Reality” future scenario in The Emerging 
Risk of Virtual Societal Warfare by Mazarr et. al. (2019) 
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Epistemic Babble scenario system maps 
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Epistemic Babble interventions and red-teaming 
The systems map has several major intervention clusters, including interventions aimed at: 
● Enhancing the capability and resilience of the population 
● Enhancing participation and development of best practice in areas of epistemic discord 
● Enhanced methods of verification of epistemic veracity 
● Changing the media ecosystem 
● Changing the behaviour of developers of future data systems (inc. algorithms) 
● Changing on-line behaviour 
 
In the State Fake News scenario the analysis of interventions identified the potential for Blue to 
win the ‘battle’ but lose the ‘war’ if not clear on long term objectives (aka moral reflection on 
Blue position with respect to ‘truth’). In this scenario an intervention was identified which was 
focused on clarifying the long term objective, and thus the pre-mortem identified a set of 
potential issues associated with that objective. 
 
The Futures Wheel again proved to be useful in providing a rapid identification of potential 
issues related to an intervention. In this case the intervention was to create a method of on-line 




Appendix 3: Technological threats and fixes 
Here we collect a non-comprehensive list of known or expected threats from emerging 
technologies to epistemic security and of some of the proposed fixes to these threats. We are 
not necessarily advocating for the adoption of any of these proposals; as highlighted in the main 
text, we strongly urge any policy to take a systemic, holistic approach and pay careful attention 
to ways specific policies or solutions may backfire, using for example a "red team" 
methodology. 
 
At the end of appendix 3, table 3.1 maps the epistemic threats described in this appendix to the 
different basic knowledge sources (experience, memory, reason, and testimony). Table 3.2 
similarly maps the proposed “fixes” presented in this appendix to the epistemic vulnerabilities 
described in the main text (attention, community, trust, and adversaries) 
Viral spread of misinformation in social media 
False, fake, or otherwise misleading information is easily created and easily propagated on 
social media (Lazer et al. 2018; Vosoughi, Roy & Aral 2018). Some proposed "fixes" include: 
● Novel regulation: across the world, governments are responding to misinformation 
through legislation, regulations and task forces (Funke & Famini 2018). For example, 
Singapore has introduced a fine for the spreading of misinformation, and also 
established by law a right for government to publish corrections alongside 
misinformation on various platforms (e.g. Facebook) and to take action to stop the 
spread of misinformation on messaging platforms. 
● Platform intelligence / automated tripwires: communication and media platforms 
such as Facebook and Twitter explore a combination of manual and automated 
processes to detect rapidly spreading content on their platform, which can then be 
flagged for fact-checking or other screening and handling. 
● Platform automated warnings / pre-scripted messaging: for certain topics (e.g. 
vaccines) platforms like Facebook and Youtube show warnings for content that is 
suspected to be misinformation, and show pre-scripted messages linking to 
authoritative sources on the matter.  
● Information literacy / misinformation education: governments, academics, NGOs and 
corporations are investing resources in educating platform users and the general public 
on how to detect misinformation and in general information literacy. For example, 
Finland has rolled out such education, including a specific focus on state-run 
propaganda, in its school system (Charlton, 2019); a Google-supported partnership of 
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NGOs and academics have created an online course on navigating digital information40; 
and Cambridge academics have created an educational game showing how 
disinformation is generated and spread (Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019). 
● Platform-wide reputation / "karma" / editorial system: platforms for user-generated 
content or contributions, like Wikipedia, Stack Overflow, or Hacker News operate a 
platform-wide system to control content additions, modifications, deletions and 
prevalence. For example, Wikipedia operates a distributed editorial system, whereas 
Stack Overflow and Hacker News operate "karma" systems where positive feedback 
from other platform users leads to greater editorial control. 
● Per-community tools for reputation / "karma" / editorial management: some 
platforms, like Facebook or Reddit, delegate editorial control to administrators, or 
"admins", per community (e.g. Facebook/Whatsapp group, subreddit) on the platform, 
with no user having editorial control across the platform (except employees of the 
company working under the company's guidelines and local laws and regulations). 
● Law enforcement work with platforms to enforce misinformation-related laws: 
government law enforcement works with platforms under the remit of available laws 
(either novel misinformation-related laws as in Singapore, or existing laws that cover 
topics like libel, defamation, hate speech or intellectual property rights) to address 
misinformation and prosecute offenders on the platforms. 
● Financial support for real-time fact checking: governments, corporations, 
philanthropists and crowds provide financial support to real-time fact checking 
organisations, such as Politifact and Snopes, that can help mitigate the effect of 
misinformation. 
● Long-term support for trustworthy information sources: In addition to fact-checking 
sources, which respond to content appearing on other channels, governments and 
other organisations also work to establish and maintain the trustworthiness of 
information sources such as the British Broadcast Corporation. This is done by 
distancing them from the need to fight for advertising revenue and by subjecting them 
to regulation. 
Machine generated fake evidence / malicious synthetic media  
Digital tools, like Photoshop, and especially AI-based tools (like Generative Adversarial 
Networks) can be used to generate fake media (e.g. images, audio) that appears real. If used at 
scale by malicious actors, this technical capability could significantly increase the cost of 
finding and establishing the truth about a particular matter, up to the point of potentially losing 




● Automatic detection: depending on the tool used to generate the synthetic / 
manipulated media, it may be possible to detect artefacts and identify the fake purely 
using data contained in the e.g. image/sounds sample. This is more easily achieved 
when the detecting party has access to the tool or machine learning model that was 
used to generate the fake. When it is possible to detect fakes in an automated manner in 
real time, platforms can use such detectors to prevent the upload or spread of such 
content. 
● Retrospective forensics: if real-time detection is not possible or available, retrospective 
forensics can be used to assess the media as well as the relevant context, to judge 
whether a piece of evidence has been faked. This could be especially relevant in legal 
contexts, or in other contexts where individual pieces of evidence can carry significant 
weight. 
● Prospective cryptographic provenance assurance: extremely-difficult-to-forge digital 
signatures exist and are used to verify signatures on documents and to authenticate 
identities online. There are some proposals to add similar digital signatures to media 
(e.g. at the camera or microphone) and then check for them downstream. However, to 
deploy this across all devices (both capture and display/playback) would be a major 
undertaking, likely requiring international standards or other major coordination efforts, 
and could also make everyday use of image and video editing problematic. 
● Proliferate "radioactive" data: research has shown that image datasets can be 
manipulated to make them "radioactive", such that outputs from synthetic generators 
trained on these datasets can be more easily detected. If a majority of public datasets 
currently used to train synthetic generators can be treated in this way, it will lower the 
cost of detection, or increase the cost for adversaries who wish to hide the fact that 
such outputs are synthetic, without harming legitimate uses of synthetic media 
generators (Hwang, 2020).  
● Limit access to technology: given the potential risks from maliciously generated 
synthetic media, some have called for developers of the enabling technologies to 
conduct pre-publication risk assessment, and in some cases choose to abandon certain 
developments or otherwise adopt selective sharing of their findings, e.g. first with 
developers of detection tools and the platforms who can deploy them. 
Automated testimonial sources (bots, language models) 
Much like fake images and audio, progress in natural language understanding and generation 
and in statistical language modelling has enabled the creation of automated text and 
conversation generators (generative language models and chat bots), which could be 
maliciously used to engage a large number of online users (Chessen 2017). Some proposed 
"fixes" include: 
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● Automatic detection: as in the case of machine generated synthetic media, artefacts of 
the generation process may be detected and used to flag automatically generated text, 
especially if the developers of the detector have access to the code or model used to 
generate the text. 
● Detection through behaviour and social patterns: similar to detection of fake images 
and audio, behaviour and social patterns could help to provide a contextual assessment 
of textual content being machine-generated. 
● Identity verification: some have suggested requiring identity verification for users on a 
platform, to make sure they are not bots (e.g. similar to the identity required now to 
engage with government or financial institutions and online services). This may be 
particularly critical in response to concerns of orchestrated and massive-scale 
disinformation campaigns that could be run through bots. 
● Limit access to technology: this involves considerations and approaches similar to the 
case of machine generated synthetic media (above). 
Online targeting and customisation 
With many aspects of life now taking place online via interaction with digital platforms, it 
becomes increasingly possible to for these platforms, or certain users of these platforms (such 
as content contributors or advertisers), to match certain content items to certain users, or to 
otherwise modify the user's experience of the platform based on information provided by the 
user and/or based on the behaviour of the user on the platform. For example, a user's 
engagement with certain videos on a platform like YouTube, or with certain pages and posts on 
a platform like Facebook, influences the content that appears in the user's recommendations or 
news feed. It also provides criteria for advertisers to select which users see which ads. 
Concerns have been raised that this technology undermines users' privacy, and allows 
malicious actors to target vulnerable individuals and communities (Centre for Data Ethics and 
Innovation 2020). Some proposed "fixes" include: 
● Advertising restrictions and transparency: the advertising targeting systems 
integrated into e.g. Facebook and Google platforms provide one of the easiest methods 
for online targeting, both for legitimate users and malicious ones. Regulations around 
advertising (e.g. age restrictions for addictive or harmful substances, spending caps and 
transparency of political ads), and their enforcement on these platforms, is one 
suggested method for limiting the harms. 
● Privacy and accountability regulations: legal frameworks like the European Union's 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) require platforms to create governance 
structures that empower users and limit their exposure to unwanted targeting. 
● Alternative business models: some have suggested that the current advertising-based 
business model of online platforms necessarily requires greater surveillance of users 
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and exposure to targeting harms (under the moniker of "Surveillance Capitalism"), and 
suggest a shift to other business models (public support, crowd support, subscription, 
or other) would be required to avert the harms. 
Amplification of falsehoods by recommendation algorithms 
In addition to spread of misinformation through social networks, and through targeting, it has 
also been observed that media platforms with user-generated content and algorithmic 
recommendations, such as YouTube, can significantly amplify the attention received by 
misinforming content available on their platforms due to the way users interact with such 
content (Chaslot 2017). Some proposed "fixes" include: 
● Manual tweaks: for certain topics or content types, platforms can create a stock of 
trusted channels or sources, or promote and demote content relative to its authoritative 
reference. 
● Specific topic warnings: for certain controversial or potentially harmful topics and 
keywords, platforms can display warning messages that link to authoritative sources. 
For example, Twitter chose this approach in response to misleading information relating 
to COVID-19.41 
● Algorithmic changes: some platforms have undertaken deeper investigations into the 
causes of algorithmic amplification of misinformation, and have experimented with 
changes to the algorithm to reduce the occurrence of such amplification. 
Algorithmically-reinforced echo chambers and filter bubbles 
People have a tendency to seek information that fits their pre-held beliefs ("confirmation bias"), 
and users of media platforms are no different. However, in addition to the user-driven dynamic 
of "echo chamber" formation discussed in the main text, there is a further concern for  systems 
with algorithmic recommendation of content. Here, the system may learn the bias of the user 
and thus create a reinforcing feedback loop whereby users become increasingly exposed to 
information that coheres with their biases (Jiang et al. 2019). Some proposed "fixes" include:  
● Education to encourage users to diversify media sources, "media diet": the easy 
availability of rich and diverse media sources means that users can easily be informed 
by more than one source (as long as they are educated and incentivised to do so), which 
can counteract the "echo chamber" effect. 
● Algorithm changes: technical proposals have been made that suggest algorithms with 
a higher emphasis on exploration and diversity of information sources can slow down 





● Create and maintain alternative fora for information sharing (online and offline): in 
addition to increasing the richness of media sources, organisations interested in 
promoting a healthy information diet can create new and more diverse fora where 
different groups can meet and exchange ideas. 
● Create and maintain "argument fora": going beyond a diversity of sources, some call 
for the creation of dedicated spaces (online and offline) where the best arguments from 
all sides of a debate are collected and curated, in order to improve the overall quality of 
discussion and disagreement and to help both sides of an argument understand the 
other. 
Sensor spoofing 
The rapid diffusion of cyber-physical systems and the "Internet of Things" mean that more 
information than ever is now collected and processed by digital sensors and computers before 
passing to a human to make a decision (if at all). While this has many benefits, it also creates an 
opportunity for adversaries to interfere with information input channels, either by providing a 
sensor with a malicious input (where a human might not have been fooled) or by hacking the 
communications or upstream processing from the sensor (Cárdenas, Amin & Sastry 2008). 
Some proposed "fixes" include: 
● Cross-checking across numerous modalities and independent sensors: adding more 
sensors that are independent from one another, and that capture different aspects of 
the phenomena, can help detect spoofing and even correct for it. 
● Tamper-proof and secure sensors: security techniques are available to increase the 
cost of physically tampering with, or computationally compromising, sensors and their 
readouts. 
Digital memory tampering or manipulation 
With increasing amounts of "memories" (retrievable past experiences) now stored on 
networked digital devices, there is a growing threat of those memories being tampered with by 
adversaries or through accidents. Memories could be changed by a malicious actor who gains 
virtual access (local or remote) to the system on which memories are stored, or through direct 
physical access to the hardware on which the memories are stored, or, for distributed systems, 
if a malicious actor is a contributing participant in the process that generates and/or records 
the memories. Various "fixes" have been proposed to address these different threats: 
● Software and hardware based access control: contemporary operating systems and 
some hardware designs maintain records of which users and processes are allowed to 
access which memories, and will prevent unauthorised access. 
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● Digital signatures: a cryptographic method to generate a short text that is derived from 
the memory contents and a secret key, which allows detection of tampering.  
● Audit logs: some systems maintain a record of all attempts to read, add, modify or 
delete content in memory, allowing the detection of unauthorised access. 
● Redundancy and error correction: some systems retain numerous copies of the 
content in memory, or store the content in a format that includes in-built redundancy, 
which allows the detection of errors and incongruities and, if enough copies are 
available, allows the reconstruction of the original and the correction of errors. 
● Tamper-proof algorithms: some cryptographic systems have been devised to retain 
certain security requirements even under conditions when an adversary has access to 
parts of the memory used by the algorithm. 
● Read-only, distributed ledgers: some cryptographic systems have been devised to 
allow a large number of users who do not necessarily trust each other to nonetheless 
agree on a single shared collection of memories and their order. 
 
Table 3.1: Epistemic threats from technology mapped to the basic knowledge sources  
Knowledge Source Epistemic Threat 
Experience ● Maliciously generated synthetic 
media (e.g. deepfakes) 
● Sensor spoofing 
Memory ● Digital memory tampering 
Reason ● Exploitation of recommendation 
algorithms 
● Algorithmically reinforced echo 
chambers 
Testimony ● Viral spread of misinformation in 
social media  
● Online targeting 








Table 3.2: Tech-based solutions to epistemic threats mapped to the epistemic vulnerabilities 
  
Epistemic Vulnerability Solutions Potential Unintended 
Consequences 
Attention ● Showing responses to 
misinformation directly 
next to the original 
content  
● Detecting and visually 
flagging problematic 
content 
● Advertising restriction  
● Privacy regulations 
● Changes to 
recommendation 
algorithms away from 
engagement 
● Same technology 
can be misused for 
censorship 
 
● Algorithmic bias 
can lead to 
information bias 
● Economic damage 
● Innovation 
slowdown 
● Unclear what 
metric to use - and 
there is no metric 
for 'truth'. 
Community ● Community tools for 
managing epistemic 
reputation 
● Education about the 
value of diversity 
● Support for a range of 
alternative foras for 
different communities to 
come together 
● Incentivise 
behaviour to 'game' 
the reputation 
system 





pressure on the 
'attention 
economy' 
Trust ● Education and 
information literacy 
● Karma systems 
● Real-time fact checking 
● Public support for 
trustworthy reporting 
● Influence or 
capture by vested 
interests 




● Identity verification 
● Support for fora and 
platforms that maintain 
high epistemic norms 
even for active debates 
and contested topics 
● Secure-by-design 
sensors, channels and 
protocols 
checkers 
● Risk of pro-
government bias 
● Silence dissent 










Adversarial Influence ● Communication platform 
monitoring 
● Law enforcement on 
communication 
platforms 
● Automated detection of 
fakes (bots, machine 
generated media)  
● Restricted access to 
dual-use technology 
● Cross-validation across 
modalities to detect 
spoofing, anomalies 
● Potential for 
misuse as 
censorship 
● Reduced public 
scrutiny of law 
enforcement 













Appendix 4: A model for understanding the costs of 
maintaining epistemic security and the impacts of 
emerging technologies thereon.  
 
Here we build a preliminary model to describe the costs of maintaining or undermining the 
epistemic security of a society given the development of new information and communication 
technologies. The purpose of the model is to demonstrate how different factors influence the 
capacity of an actor (e.g. a government institution or adversary) for influencing a society’s ability 
to organize well-informed collective action by disseminating information.  
 
In the model, we keep track of the following costs: 
 
Symbol Epistemic-related cost 
I Total cost of having informed decision making, i.e. of being 
epistemically secure. 
G Cost of gathering information directly from the world 
E Cost of establishing and maintain a new information channel 
R Cost of retrieving information from an existing channel 
A Cost of deciding whether to attend to an information channel 
M Cost of merging information from multiple channels 
D Cost of detecting information channels controlled by 
adversaries 
C Cost of counteracting information channels controlled by 
adversaries, either through counter-messaging or coordination 
amongst decision makers to ignore adversarial channels 
P Cost of preventing adversaries from establishing information 
channels 
 
And the following quantities: 
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#DM Number of decision makers 
#IU Number of information units 
#IC Number of existing information channels 
#A Number of adversaries 
#AC Number of adversary-controlled channels 
 
We build the model up in stages. We start from a simple, unrealistic, non-representative state, 
one of information scarcity, a single decision maker, and no adversaries, and slowly replace 
each component with ones that add complexity but better represent our current challenges. We 
found the process of conceptualizing the model to be just as informative as the end product.  
 
Stage 1: Information scarcity, single decision maker 
In a context of information scarcity, a single decision maker will take actions to gain information 
about the world. These actions can be one-off, where time and resources (costs) are expended 
to gain decision-relevant information, or longer-term, where costs are spent establishing an 
information channel, which reduces the cost for later information gathering actions. 
In the first alternative, the decision-maker gathers the information directly from the world 
 
I = G*#IU  
 
In the second alternative, the decision-maker establishes an information source and a channel 
to that source, and then retrieves information from that channel. 
 
I = E + R*#IU 
Stage 2: Information scarcity, multiple decision makers 
When there are many decision makers, and they stand to gain from collective, coordinated 
action, they may choose to share information sources, and choose to jointly invest in 
establishing information sources. 
 
I = E + R*#DM*#IU 
 
107 
Because coordination requires a shared picture of the world, a channel needs to be established 
that connects all decision-makers, which will be more expensive than in the previous stage (E is 
higher). Note, however, that the cost to establish that channel and connect it to all decision-
makers may be far lower than the cost to establish one channel per decision-maker (which 
would be E*#DM). 
Stage 3: Information abundance, single decision maker 
When many sources of information have been developed, or where the cost of generating 
information drops, the amount of available information increases. At some point it becomes 
more advantageous to get information from an already established information source (even if it 
is not controlled by the decision maker) than it is to develop new information sources. The task 
then shifts from creating information sources to evaluating information sources, allocating 
attention efficiently, and combining information from different sources into a coherent picture 
of the world. 
 
I = A*#IC + R*#IU + M*#IU 
 
Note that the cost of information retrieval (R) in this situation is near-zero. 
Stage 4: Information abundance, single decision maker, with adversaries 
In the presence of adversaries, who may control some of the numerous information channels, 
and who are feeding deliberately misleading information through these channels, the decision 
maker needs not only to allocate attention, they must also learn to identify and discard 
misinformation channels, and if possible take actions to restrict the adversaries' ability to create 
or use information channels. When the cost for the adversary to establish (or co-opt) 
information channels decreases, or when the cost for the adversary to masquerade as a high-
value information channel decreases, the cost to the decision maker increases. 
 
In the first alternative, the decision-maker detects and counteracts the adversarial channels, 
and then proceeds as before to attend, retrieve and merge information from the remaining 
"safe" channels. 
 
I = (D+C)*#AC + A*(#IC-#AC) + R*#IU + M*#IU  
 
Alternatively, the decision-maker can choose to prevent adversaries from creating information 
channels, and thus proceed in the knowledge that all channels are "safe". 
 
I = P*#A + A*#IC + R*#IU + M*#IU 
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As the cost for adversaries to establish new channels decreases, the cost to the decision-maker 
increases, by either increasing the detection and counteraction costs or by increasing the 
prevention costs. The choice between detection and prevention may depend on the context of 
the decision-maker, and the various consequences of adopting one strategy or the other (for 
example, prevention may be unacceptably costly in a society with strong "free speech" 
protections). 
Stage 5: Information abundance, multiple decision makers, with adversaries 
In this setting it is not enough for the decision maker to identify and discard information 
sources controlled by adversaries, they also need to prevent adversaries from affecting other 
decision makers - either by preventing their access to information creation and distribution, or 
by exposing and communicating their control by an adversary, or by creating controlled 
communication channels that would gain more attention than the adversaries' channels. As the 
cost for the adversaries to establish channels to numerous decision makers decreases, and as 
the adversaries' ability to capture attention and masquerade as a high reliability information 
source increases, the cost for the key decision maker to maintain coordination of the numerous 
decision makers increases. 
 
Again, the decision-makers have two alternatives, one to detect and counter adversaries and 
the other is to prevent adversaries' access to channel creation. However, this scenario now has 
the added cost of coordinating the response to adversaries across all decision makers. 
 
Detection and countering: 
 
I = D*#AC + C*#AC*#DM + A*#IC*#DM + R*#IU + M*#IU 
 
Note the need to coordinate the response to adversarial channels, which increases the cost as 
the number of decision-makers increases: while detection of adversarial channels can be 
performed by a small subset of decision-makers, they need to be countered effectively for every 
decision-maker, or decision-making group, who might otherwise be influenced by them. With 




I = P*#A + C*#IC*#DM + R*#IU + M*#IU 
 
Given the above, here are the components of the challenge we are facing: 
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● Democracies are defined by having numerous decision makers for key collective 
decisions (#DM is high).  
● In many democracies there are also limits to restrictions that can be placed on actors' 
ability to access or create information channels, due to protections of "free speech" (P is 
high). 
● Our current technology already makes the cost of establishing new information 
channels (both broadcast and targeted) near-zero (making #AC large). 
● Current and near-future technologies make the cost of grabbing attention and faking 
high reliability near-zero, or at least orders of magnitude cheaper than before (making A 
and D high). 
 
This means that, even while innovations in information technology have significantly reduced 
the cost of retrieving and merging information (making R and M low), the overall cost for those 
interested in maintaining informed, coordinated decision-making is rapidly increasing.  
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